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The Mechanics of Judicial Vote Switching

Abstract: In a handful of cases, including one from last
Term, the United States Supreme Court was divided
between upholding, remanding, and overturning a
lower court decision, with no majority in favor of any
of these three dispositions. In each of these cases, at
least one Justice switched his or her vote to achieve a
majority. With the Supreme Court taking ever fewer
cases and producing increasingly complicated split
decisions, we may expect this pattern to recur more
often. This Article, drawing upon game theory and
public choice scholarship, addresses how and why
this practice of strategic vote-switching emerged, and
contrasts the practice with alternative solutions.
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Introduction
In 2003, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle1 splintered the United States Supreme
Court. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg, voted to remand
the case.2 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, voted to
reverse the South Carolina Supreme Court decision.3 Meanwhile, Justice Thomas voted
to uphold the decision below.4
The remaining decision-maker, Justice Stevens, found himself in a situation
unusual for Supreme Court Justices.5 Excluding his vote, there were four votes to
remand, three votes to reverse, and one vote to uphold. Justice Stevens stated that he
preferred to “simply affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Were
I to adhere to my preferred disposition of the cases, however, there would be no
controlling judgment of the Court.”6 That is, if Justice Stevens voted to affirm, the Court
would be deadlocked 3-4-2 in favor of overturning, remanding, and upholding,
respectively.
What should a Supreme Court Justice do in this situation?
Justice Stevens cited the first instance in modern history of a similar potential for
deadlock.7 In Screws v. United States,8 a 1945 case, four Justices voted to remand the case,
three Justices voted to reverse, and one Justice voted to affirm. This left Justice Rutledge
who preferred to affirm the lower court’s decision. Fearing a 3-4-2 deadlock, Justice
Rutledge switched his vote to remand “in order that disposition may be made of this

539 U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4798 (June 23, 2003). For a preliminary analysis of the issues
raised in the case, see H. Ron Davidson et al., “Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle: The Uncertain Fate of Class
Arbitration,” 3-10 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. CLASS ACTIONS 29 (2003) (with Bob P. Davis & Eldad Z. Malamuth);
The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases: III Federal Statutes and Regulations: C. Federal Arbitration Act, 117
Harv. L. Rev. 410 (2003).
2 123 S.Ct. at 2404.
3 Id. at 2408.
4 Id. at 2411.
5 Similar U.S. Supreme Court multidimensional triple choice cases are of two types. The first group of cases
involves Justices switching from affirming to remanding. See, e.g. (1) Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 113
(1945) (Rutledge); (2) Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Stevens); (3) Ben Chavez v.
Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4274 (May 27, 2003) (Kennedy, Stevens, and Ginsburg); (4)
Olmstead v. Georgia Dept of Human Resources, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (Stevens); (5) Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624
(1998) (Stevens).
The second group involves Justices switching from overturning to remanding. See, e.g. (1) Von Moltke v.
Gillies, 322 U.S. 708, 709 (1948) (Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge); (2) Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S.
601, 616 (1949) (Rutledge) (judgment modified by Klapprott v. United States, 336 U.S. 942 (1949) with a
different majority); (3) Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 410 (1954) (Frankfuter, Reed, Jackson,
and Burton). See also Action House, Inc. v. Koolik, 54 F.3d 1009, 1014 (2d Cir. 1995) (Chief Judge Newman)
(citing other cases).
A third group, which appears in lower courts, involves switches from remanding to overturning. See, e.g. (1)
Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261 (2001) (3rd Cir. 2001) (Becker changing from remanding for further
determinations on the appropriateness of a habeas proceedings to overturning a lower court decision and
granting a writ of habeas corpus); (2) People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36 (1984) (Grodin). Professors Abramowicz
and Stearns would add the case of Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), as a multidimensional triple choice case.
Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political Economy of Bush v. Gore,
54 Vand. L. Rev. 1849, (2001) (using the term “multidimensional”). Unidimensional cases are discussed in
Part I.A.
6 123 S.Ct. 2402.
7 Id.
8 325 U.S. 91, 113 (1945).
1
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case.”9 Following this precedence, Justice Stevens agreed to remand the case in Green
Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle despite his stated preference to uphold.10 Every time there has
been no majority on the disposition of a case, at least one Justice switched his or her vote
to achieve one.
But why?
The reason for the rule in Screws remains a mystery. No United States Supreme
Court Justice who switched his or her vote has ever offered justifications for the rule in
Screws requiring a majority. Lower courts also fail to offer any rationales for the rule,11
even though many are baffled by the practice.12 Only California Supreme Court Justice
Grodin has offered a (tautological and succinct) justification, asserting that it would
“obviously [be] intolerable” for a Justice not to switch his or her vote to achieve a
majority. 13 Finally, commentators, who touch on the rule tangentially,14 do not fare
better that Justice Grodin in elaborating on the rule. They call it “necessary”15 and
“appropriate”16 to avoid “judgment impasse.”17
For the litigants in Green Tree and Screws and other cases, these justifications from
the bench and commentators are unconvincing. First, the Screws rule requiring a
majority seems to contradict a long-established principle that no vote switching is
necessary when the Court is tied 4-4.18 Furthermore, no majority is needed as to the
reasoning of the Court, so – one could argue – no majority is required for a case’s
disposition either.19 Third, no majority of any Court has ever accepted the rule in Screws
(and those Justices who do adopt the rule cite no cases, tradition or norms to support
it).20 For these reasons, the rule should not govern the wide-range of cases that it does.
This Article explains the nuts and bolts of Screws requiring a majority
disposition. The first description for the mechanics of judicial vote switching focuses on
the phenomenon of negotiating or contracting around the default rule. Specifically,
without a vote switch, cases like Green Tree and Screws would be treated as an

Id.
123 S. Ct. 2411.
11 There are additional options available to a court, including denying the writ of certiorari as improperly
granted. Although this Article does not deal with this option as extensively as it does with the three most
prevalent options, the ability to deny the writ affects behavior. See Part III. C.
12 Colleman v. Jahncke Serv., Inc., 341 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1965) (confusion over how to interpret Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954), and stating “it is impossible to say what the Cushing case stands
for”); Pedcor Mgmt. C. Welfare Benefit Plan. V. Nations Pers. Of Tex, Inc., 343 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003) (confusing
generated by Green Tree).
13 People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 71 (1984) (switching from remand to overturn).
14 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 Mich. L. Rev.
2297 (1999) (calling the practice “play[ing] chicken” but avoiding discussing it); Maxwell L. Stearns, Should
Justices Ever Switch Votes? Miller v. Albright in Social Choice Perspective, 7 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 87, 109 (1999)
(simply mentioning the practice). But see, Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3
Theoretical Inq. L. 87 (2002) (directly asking this question). Dean Levmore’s argument will be discussed in
Part III, C.
15 John M. Rogers, “’I Vote This Way Because I’m Wrong’: The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides,” 79
Ky. L.J. 439, 458 (1991).
16 Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 643, 672 (2002)
17 Id.
18 See Part II. A.
19 See Part III. C.
20 See Part III. B.
9

10
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affirmation by a divided court.21 For example, in the Green Tree context, the decision of
the South Carolina Supreme Court would be upheld since there was no majority
originally to displace the state court decision.
Given this default rule, Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have an incentive to
find more a preferable disposition of the case. In Green Tree, a majority of the Justices
might have preferred remanding the case to upholding it. As such, the Justices had an
incentive to engage in vote switching to achieve the more favorable disposition. As
discussed in more detail in Part II, this approach explains the direction of the voteswitches in all of the cases as a form of concealed negotiations around the default rule of
affirmation.
Some, however, do not agree that upholding is the default rule in cases like Green
Tree. Judge Rogers has argued that remanding is the default rule in practice, for reasons
that will be criticized in Part II. B.22 Professors Kornhauser and Sage have argued that
issue-by-issue voting should be the default rule,23 and the flaws with their approach are
discussed in Part II. C. Because there is also some language in the opinions to support
these alternative default rules and there is no conclusive proof that the affirm default
rule is correct,24 I offer a second and more complex reason for the Screws rule:
negotiations over the default, and not around it.
As discussed in Part III, one could also explain the phenomenon observed in
Green Tree as a procedural submajority rule that affects which default rule governs
deadlocked cases. In Green Tree, Justice Stevens alone was able to prevent a debate over
whether upholding (as I suggest), remanding (as Judge Rogers suggests), or issue-byissue voting (as Professors Kornhasuer and Sage suggest) is the default rule in cases like
Screws and Green Tree by switching his vote on the merits. Whenever cases like Screws
arise, a submajority group of Justices close debate over the default rule by switching
their votes. To phrase the second and more complex description of the mechanics of
judicial vote switching, if the Court lacks unanimity over the default rule, any
submajority can thwart deliberation and consensus over it by resorting to vote
switching.
Before turning to the complexities involved with the Screws rule, it is worth
pausing to note that this Article is entirely descriptive. The Economics literature shows

See Part II. A.
John M. Rogers, “’I Vote This Way Because I’m Wrong”: The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides,” 79
Ky. L.J. 439, 458 (1991) (“In these situations, it makes sense for the ‘middle’ position [namely remand] to
obtain.”).
23 See Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sage, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81
Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1993). See also, David Post and Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of
Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 Georgetown L. J. 743, 744 (1992).
24 Specifically, I mean a three-way deadlock that was affirmed (without any vote switch) by a deadlocked
Court. Such a decision would clearly demonstrate that affirmation is the default rule and was explicitly
recognized. The most suggestive case is United States v. Jordan et al., 342 U.S 911 (1952) in which “The
judgment [was] affirmed by an equally divided Court.” The exact make-up of this equal division remains
unclear for we only learn in the two-sentence opinion that Justice Frankfuter voted to dismiss the writ as
improperly granted. Id. How the other Justices (and how many of them) voted remains unclear.
There are reasons why the Justices would want to have the default rule hidden, for example, to be used to
create the artificial deadlocks discussed in Part I. C. Consequently, the lack of a clear explanation of the
contours of the default rule in cases like United States v. Jordan is not surprising.
21
22
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that strategic behavior is inevitable,25 and any default rule will induce some Justices to
switch his or her vote in some situations. No default rule will be “strategyproof.”26
Furthermore, the problem of cycling is inescapable as demonstrated by the famous work
of Kenneth Arrow.27 The goal here is not to suggest that one default rule or one strategy
to avoid cycling is better than another, but rather to offer explanations for a
phenomenon that has generated much confusion and little consensus.

I.

Background of the Screws Problem

To understand the nuts and bolts of the Screws rule, one must first understand
the two situations in which the rule is applied. Cases in the first group are so-called
“unidimensional triple choice cases”28 because the Justices are confronted with one issue
in which there are three different choices for the outcome. Cases in the second group, socalled “multidimensional triple choice cases,”29 are more complex. Justices must decide
more than one issue, and the way in which each Justice solves the multiple issues will
determine how he or she votes on the outcome of the case. The difference between uniand multidimensional cases is best understood by looking at examples.

A. Unidimensional Triple Choice Cases
The case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.30 is reflective of the several unidimensional
triple choice cases discussing the Freedom of the Press.31 Elmer Gertz, a member of the
National Lawyers Guild for 15 years, represented the family of a youth killed by a
Chicago policeman in 1968. The American Opinion printed articles about the civil rights
case in which the paper called Mr. Gertz a “Leninist” and an official of the “Marxist
League of Industrial Democracy.” Mr. Gertz sued, and the jury awarded him $50,000.
Under Illinois law, the jury was allowed to measure damages but not to assess the
recklessness of the newspaper.32
Following the verdict, the federal trial judge entered a judgment not
withstanding the verdict in favor of Robert Welsch, Inc., owner of the American
Opinion. The trial judge held that that the leading Freedom of the Press case, New York
Times v. Sullivan, applied and that the First Amendment protected the press from libel
suits by private individuals. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
trial court’s decision.33

Allan Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41 Econometrica 587 (1973) (proving no
solution), Matthew Satterthwaite, Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence
Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions, 10 J. Econ. Theory 187 (1975), (same); Allan
Gibbard, Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance, 45 Econometrica 665 (1977) (discussing
whether randomly picking a winner prevents switching), Douglas H. Blair, On the Ubiquity of Strategic
Voting Opportunities, 22 Int’l Econ. Rev. 649 (1981) (listing possible exceptions in very limited cases which do
not apply here). Strategic behavior could be limiting if each Justice were given a lottery ticket and the
winner of the lottery would determine the case. See text in conclusion. In addition, the lottery system would
not necessarily be a Condorcet winner between various procedures.
26 See n 25.
27 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (2d Ed. 1963).
28 See, e.g. Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell L. Stears, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political Economy of Bush
v. Gore, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1849 (2001).
29 Id.
30 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
31 U.S. Const. Amend. I.
32 Id.
33 Id. (citing 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
25
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Reasons to Uphold the Lower Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court Justices were divided on the whether the
principles of New York Times applied to suits filed by private individuals. On one end of
the spectrum, one finds those who believed in extending protections. Justice Douglas,
who voted for absolute immunity in New York Times,34 voted to uphold the dismissal of
the complaint in Gertz. In his opinion, the American Opinion was entitled to absolute
immunity in reporting issues of public concern, whether they involved public or private
individuals.35
Justice Brennan agreed that the case should be dismissed but disagreed on the
applicable legal standard. He would apply a “knowledge of its falsity or [] reckless
disregard of the truth” standard instead of Justice Douglas’ absolute immunity standard.
Because there was no evidence of such knowledge or recklessness, Justice Brennan also
voted to dismiss the case against the paper. 36
Reasons to Reverse the Lower Court
Justice White voted to reinstate the jury verdict. He believed that “those who
wrote the First Amendment [did not] intend[] to prohibit the [] Government . . . from
providing the private citizen a peaceful remedy from damaging falsehood.” New York
Times v. Sullivan carved out an exception for libel against public individuals because
“[i]n a democratic society . . . the citizen has the privilege of criticizing his government
and its officials.” Beyond this exception, “the First Amendment did not confer a ‘license
to defame the [private] citizen.’”37
Chief Justice Burger, also dissenting, voted to reverse the dismissal and reinstate
the jury verdict, but for reasons different from those offered by Justice White. A
standard of negligence, the Chief Justice argued, would force newspaper editors to
reconsider what they published. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger believed that private
lawyers in Mr. Gertz’s position should be allowed to sue for libel. “The right to counsel
would be gravely jeopardized if every lawyer who takes an ‘unpopular’ case, civil or
criminal, would automatically become fair game for irresponsible reporters and
editors.”38
Reasons to Remand with a Recklessness Standard
So far, there were two groups of Justices: Justices Douglas and Brennan who
wanted to uphold; and Chief Justice Burger and Justice White who wanted to reverse. A
third group, composed of Justices Powell, Stewart, Marshall, and Rehnquist, ordered a
new trial. First, these Justices held that New York Times did not explicitly govern cases of
libel against private individuals. Nevertheless, they held that no jury could impose
liability without first finding fault on the part of the publisher. Because the trial court
instructed the jury it did not need to find fault pursuant to Illinois law, these four
Justices ordered a new trial in which the jury would be properly instructed.39
Before turning to Justice Blackmun’s crucial vote, it would be useful to place the
positions of the Justices along a spectrum. On one end, we have Justice Douglas with an
absolute immunity standard, and Justice Brennan with a recklessness standard. Chief
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
418 U.S. 323
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
34
35
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Justice Burger and Justice White are on the other end of the spectrum, deferring to state
law over what standard to impose in the case. Finally, Justice Powell found himself in
the center, requiring proof of fault.
Absolute Immunity
Recklessness
Proof of Fault
State Law
<-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->
Douglas
Brennan
Powell +3
Burger + White
Uphold
Uphold
Remand
Reverse
The final decision-maker, Justice Blackmun, agreed with Justice Brennan that
New York Times applied and that a private litigant must prove either knowledge of
falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. However, he noted how fractured the
Court appeared and was concerned by the uncertainty that division could create. “If my
vote were not needed to create a majority, I would adhere to my prior view [and
uphold]. ... I feel that it is of profound importance for the Court to come to rest in the
defamation area and to have a clearly defined majority position that eliminates the
unsureness defined by [] diversity.” Because “[a] definitive ruling [] is paramount,” he
concurred in remanding the case for a new trial despite his preference for upholding the
dismissal of the verdict.40

Id. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. is reflective of a series of cases in which the Justices were divided along a
spectrum on the extension of New York Times v. Sullivan to private individuals. Consider Time, Inc. v. Hill.
385 U.S. 374 (1967). On one end of the spectrum, one finds Justices Black and Douglas who argued the First
Amendment creates an absolute immunity for the press. Consequently, they voted to reverse a verdict
against a publisher. Id. On the other end of the spectrum, one finds Justice Fortas, joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Clark. These Justices believed that a jury instruction requiring proof of “reckless or
wanton disregard of the plaintiff’s rights” was sufficient and voted to uphold the New York court’s award
of damages. Id.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Clark, Stewart, and White, believed that the New York jury instructions
were insufficient and that the case should be remanded. They said, the “trial judge [must] instruct the jury
that a verdict of liability could be predicated only a finding of knowing or reckless falsity in the publication
of the [ ] article.” Id. Justice Harlan, while agreeing that the case should be remanded, dissented because he
believed that the appropriate standard was negligence. Id.
Conceptually, the Justices fall along the following spectrum:
Plaintiff’s rights
Negligence to Truth
Reckless to Truth Absolute Immunity
<----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->
Fortas +2
Harlan
Brennan +3
Black +1
Uphold
Remand
Remand
Reverse
Since there was no majority on the disposition of the case, Justices Black and Douglas shifted their position
from reversing to remanding using the recklessness standard.
The Justices in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. took positions along a similar spectrum. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Stewart, held that the standard was low: anything above strict liability
would be sufficient. Id. Justice Harlan argued that proof of negligence was required. These Justices voted to
overturn the Third Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision to dismiss the verdict. Id.
On the other end of the spectrum, Justice Black, concurring, re-iterated his belief in an absolute immunity.
Id. Justice White, concurring, required proof of actual malice. Id. Finally, Justice Brennan, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, required a “reasonable care” standard but noted that there was “no
evidence in the record to support a conclusion that respondent ‘in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth’ of its reports.” Id. Justice Douglas did not participate.
Conceptually, we have the following spectrum:
Strict Liability
Negligence
Reasonable Care Malice
Absolute Immunity
<----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->
Marshall +1
Harlan Do
uglas +2
White
Black
Reverse
Reverse
Uphold
Uphold
Uphold

40
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B. Multidimensional Triple Choice Cases
Screws v. United States and Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle differ from cases like
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. in that more than one issue was presented to the Justices.
Consider these two multidimensional triple choice cases in chronological order.
Mr. Screws, a white police officer in Georgia, handcuffed, beat, and dragged
Robert Hall, an African American, during the course of an arrest. Hall later died, and the
United States prosecuted Screws and his accomplices for acting “under color of any law”
to deprive Mr. Hall’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States.” The jury convicted Screws without being
instructed of any intent requirement under the statute; Screws appealed the case to the
United States Supreme Court.41
Four questions were before the Court:
(1) Did the statute apply?
(2) If it did, was the statute unconstitutional?
(3) If it was unconstitutional, could the Court limit the statute to make it
constitutional?
(4) Finally, if the Court could limit the statute, was a new trial necessary?
Reasons to Overturn the Conviction
Justices Roberts, Frankfuter, and Jackson, dissenting, first addressed the question
of whether the statute applied to police officers like Screws. To be liable, the acts of the
officers needed to be committed “under color of any law.” Since Screws had acted
outside his capacity as an agent of the state, these Justices believed that his acts were
beyond the statute, and the charges should be dropped.42
Next, Justice Roberts argued that the charges should be dropped because the act
was unconstitutionally vague. The statute’s domain, he wrote for the two other Justices,
“is unbounded and therefore too indefinite. Criminal statutes must have more or less
specific contours. This has none.”43
Third, Justices Roberts, Frankfuter, and Jackson felt “it was settled early in our
history that prosecutions in the federal courts could not be founded on any undefined
body of so-called common law.” Consequently, these three Justices refused to limit the
statute to make it constitutional. Despite the gravity of Mr. Screws’ offense, he should be
freed.44

There was no vote switching in this case since there was a majority in favoring of upholding the judgment
below. The outcome, however, would be different had (1) there been evidence of a lack of reasonable care
and (2) the trial court instruct the jury under a negligence standard. Under this hypothetical fact pattern,
Justices Harlan and Marshall would uphold a verdict. Justice Douglas, however, would remand the case to
have a jury determine whether reasonable care was exercised. Finally, Justices White and Black would vote
to reverse the verdict, finding the negligence standard insufficient.
Thus, while no vote switch occurred in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, the positions of the Justices create the
potential for deadlock in future cases. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), has a similar
potential. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), is cited in these cases, but is best understood as a
multidimensional triple choice case. See Part I. B.
41 325 U.S. 91, 113 (1945).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
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Reasons to Remand the Case for a New Trial
Justice Douglas, joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Black and Reed,
disagreed. First, they believed Screws had acted under the color of state law when he
murdered Mr. Hall. Next, they found that the statute, as applied, was unconstitutional.
However, if the statute were “confined more narrowly than the lower courts confined it,
it can be preserved as one of the sanctions to the great rights which the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to secure.” They discussed how an intent requirement would
cure the constitutional deficiency.45
After limiting the scope of the statute, these Justices voted to remand the case.
“To convict it was necessary for [the jury] to find that petitioners had the purpose to
deprive the prisoner of a constitutional right.” A new trial would make a determination
of the willfulness of Mr. Screws’ actions.46
Reasons to Uphold the Conviction
Justice Murphy believed a new trial was not necessary and that the charges
should be upheld. While it is true that a statute must “give[] fair warning” to the
accused, he believed there was no dispute that Screws intended to murder Mr. Hall. “A
new trial could hardly make [the] fact [that Screws acted willfully] more evident; the
failure to charge the jury on willfulness was at most an inconsequential error.”
Consequently, the conviction should stand.47
This left one final decision-maker, Justice Rutledge. Excluding his vote, three
Justices voted to reverse the charges, four voted to remand the case for a new trial, and
one Justice voted to uphold the charges. Justice Rutledge agreed with the reasoning of
Justice Murphy and wanted to uphold the charges. He wrote, “When, as here, a state
official abuses his place consciously or grossly in abnegation of its rightful obligation,
and thereby tramples underfoot the established constitutional rights of men or citizens,
his conviction should stand when he has had a fair trial and full defense. ... Accordingly,
I would affirm the judgment.”48
What follows is the paragraph that supports a rule in favor of mandating a
majority disposition:
My convictions are as I have stated them. Were it possible for me to
adhere to them in my vote, and for the Court at the same time to
dispose of the cause, I would act accordingly. The Court, however, is
divided in opinion. If each member accords his vote to his belief, the
case cannot have disposition. Stalemate should not prevail for any
reason, however compelling, in a criminal cause or, if avoidable, in
any other. My views concerning appropriate disposition are more
nearly in accord with those stated by Mr. Justice Douglas, in which
three other members of the Court concur, than they are with the
views of my dissenting brethren who favor outright reversal.
Accordingly, in order that disposition may be made of this case, my
vote has been cast to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand the cause to the District Court for further proceedings in

Id.
Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
45
46
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accordance with the disposition required by the opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas.49
This was the entire argument in favor of vote switching.
To summarize the positions of the Justices, consider the following table:
Roberts + 2
Douglas +3
Murphy/Rutledge
Color of Law:
No
Yes
Yes
Unconstitutional:
Yes
Yes
Yes
Fixable:
No
Yes
Yes
Harmless error:
No
Yes
Dismiss
Remand
Uphold
Note that Justice Roberts’ opinion does not touch on the harmlessness of the error.
The case of Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle follows a similar pattern, but with a
twist that is central to the analysis below: Green Tree is really two cases combined into
one. Both Mr. and Mrs. Bazzles and Mr. Lackey entered into contracts with Green Tree
Financial Corporation. These contracts, which were nearly identical, stipulated that
disputes between “us” (i.e. Green Tree) and “you” (i.e. the Bazzles and Mr. Lackey)
would be settled by arbitration. The contract language did not, however, discuss
whether the Bazzles or Mr. Lackey could proceed on a class-wide basis in arbitration.50
After disputes arose under the Green Tree contracts, the lawyers for the Bazzles
and Mr. Lackey sought a procedure known as class action arbitration. In the Bazzle
proceedings, a court agreed to certify a class of similarly situated plaintiffs and then sent
that class to arbitration. In the Lackey proceedings, however, the arbitrator (and not the
court) certified the class and then proceeded with arbitration on a class-wide basis.51
This distinction is important for reasons that will become clear in Part II. B.
Lawyers for Green Tree Financial Corp. argued that both the state trial court and
the arbitrator violated the Federal Arbitration Act, which requires arbitration
agreements to be interpreted “according to their terms.” The terms of the contracts in
Bazzle and Lackey provided for arbitration between “us” and “you”. The lawyers for
Green Tree argued that these terms unambiguously prevented class action arbitration
and that plaintiffs like the Bazzles and Mr. Lackey would have to proceed in
individualized arbitration proceedings (i.e. the contract meant “you, and only you”).52
The Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected these arguments. It held that the
contracts were ambiguous and that they should be construed against their drafters as a
matter of state contract law. The state’s highest court also stated that class action
arbitration serves state policies by promoting efficiency. Green Tree appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court.53
Reasons to Uphold the State Court Decision
Justice Thomas voted to uphold the state’s highest court decision. Citing two of
his earlier dissents, he stated that that the FAA does not apply to the states and that the
South Carolina Supreme Court’s “interpretation of a private arbitration agreement”
should be left “undisturbed.”54
Id.
539 U.S. __ (2003).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
49
50
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Justice Stevens also voted (at first) to uphold the cases, but along different lines.
While the FAA applies to the states, he felt “there is nothing in the Federal Arbitration
Act that precludes [the] determinations [made by] the Supreme Court of South
Carolina.” As a matter of state contract law, the Supreme Court of South Carolina’s
treatment of the case was within the confines of the FAA.55
Reasons to Overturn the State Court Decision
Meanwhile, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by two other Justices, voted to
overturn the South Carolina Supreme Court decision. These Justices believed that the
state court’s decision “contravenes the terms of the contract and is therefore pre-empted
by the FAA.” They agreed with Green Tree’s arguments that “[e]ach contract expressly
defines ‘us’ as [Green Tree], and ‘you’ as the . . . [individuals] named in that specific
contract.” Consequently, “[t]hese provisions ... make quite clear that [Green Tree] must
select, and each buyer must agree to, a particular arbitrator for disputes between [Green
Tree] and that specific buyer.” According to this logic, the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s decision allowing class action arbitration was wrong and must be overturned;
the contracts unambiguously prevented the procedure in both the Bazzle and Lackey
cases.56
Reasons to Remand the Case to an Arbitrator
Justice Breyer, joined by three Justices, questioned whether “the contracts’
language is as clear as the Chief Justice believes. The case arbitrator was ‘selected by’
Green Tree ‘with consent of Green Tree’s customers, [the Bazzles and Mr. Lackey].”
Indeed, Justice Breyer reasoned, “class arbitration involves an arbitration,” and an
ambiguity existed.57
These four Justices, however, voted to remand the case because they believed an
arbitrator, not a court, should resolve this ambiguity. “Whether the agreement forbids
class arbitration,” Justice Breyer wrote, “is for the arbitrator to decide.” Although courts
have important roles in “gateway matters, such as whether the parties have a valid
arbitration agreement or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a
certain type of controversy,” an arbitrator is to decide “what kind of arbitration
proceedings the parties agreed to.” Consequently, the Bazzle case must be remanded to
an arbitrator because the South Carolina Supreme Court, instead of the arbitrator,
decided to proceed on a class-wide basis.58
In the Lackey proceedings, an arbitrator made an independent determination that
the contract allowed arbitration. Nevertheless, by creative lawyering, Justice Breyer
sidestepped this issue finding “there is at least a strong likelihood in Lackey as well as in
Bazzle that the arbitrator’s decision reflected a court’s interpretation of the contracts
rather than an arbitrator’s [independent] interpretation.”59 Consequently, the Lackey
proceedings, as well as the Bazzle proceedings, had to be remanded to the arbitrator.
The Chief Justice disagreed with Justice Breyer’s decision to remand the cases to
the arbitrator. The Chief Justice held that “the interpretation of [a] contract [and whether
it allows class action arbitration] is for the court, not the arbitrator.” Justice Stevens, who
believed “[a]rguably the interpretation of the parties’ agreement should have been made
Id.
Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Davidson, et al., supra n 1, at 2 (“Justice Breyer neatly skirted one of the factual issues.”).
55
56

- 12 of 47 -

The Mechanics of Judicial Vote Switching

in the first instance by the arbitrator, rather than the court,” nevertheless stated, “there is
no need to remand the case to correct that possible error.”60
To summarize the issues that arose:
Thomas
Stevens
Rehnquist +2 Breyer +3
FAA applies to states:
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Ambiguous:
Yes
No
Yes
Remand:
No
No
Yes
Uphold
Uphold
Overturn
Remand
Because there was no majority disposition, Justice Stevens switched from upholding to
remanding the cases, believing Justice Breyer’s opinion closer to his own that the Chief
Justice’s opinion. Other multidimensional triple choice cases follow the pattern of Screws
and Green Tree.
Subsequent portions of this Article will return to the differences between uniand multidimensional cases and discuss whether different rules should apply for each.
Before turning to these differences, it is useful to consider a Legal Realist argument that
Screws governs no cases at all.

C. TheScrews Rule Governs No Cases
There is an argument that unidimensional and multidimensional triple choice
cases are artificially created to serve the interests of the switching Justice.61 To
understand how, consider the case of State v. Post,62 in which a majority of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey voted to send an enslaved individual, Mr. Williams, back to his
master.
Justice Randolf’s concurring opinion deserves closer attention and offers
guidance to the modern-day Screws rule. From the beginning of his opinion, Justice
Randolf writes of the freedoms guaranteed by state constitutions across the country. In
addition, he asserts, “The citizens of New Jersey are as devoted to freedom as those of
any other state.” From these statements, it seems as if Justice Randolf would release Mr.
Williams from the shackles that bind him to – what Justice Randolf calls – “the evils of
slavery.”63
Nevertheless, Justice Randolf votes to send Mr. Williams back to his master
because the people of New Jersey “are differently situated and have unfortunately
imbibed from their settlement different principles [regarding freedom, and the
constitution protects] the evils of slavery.” For Justice Randolf, to release Mr. Williams
would be “a wanton stretch of judicial power and a fraud upon those who framed, as
well as on those who adopted [the state constitution].” He prayed, “Application should
be made to the legislature and not the judiciary” to rectify the America’s peculiar
institution.64
At first glance, it seems Justice Randolf is quite the humanitarian, and his
statements encouraging freedom and the end of slavery should be commended. Yet, it is
his vote that sends Mr. Williams back to slavery. One could argue that Justice Randolf’s
opinion criticizing slavery was written to mask the Justice’s true beliefs about the
539 U.S. __ (2003).
Whether this is normatively problematic, see Jonathan R. Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol
Paradigm for Multimember Courts, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 75, 85 (2003).
62 20 N.J.L. 368 (1845). I thank Anna Pervukin for the reference.
63 Id.
64 Id.
60
61

- 13 of 47 -

The Mechanics of Judicial Vote Switching

institution. That is, Justice Randolf might have sugarcoated his racist views on slavery
by pretending to be against it, knowing that in the end, these hortatory statements will
make no difference to individuals like Mr. Williams.
People v. Post teaches us of the need to look beyond the rhetoric of judicial
opinions. Often a Justice’s vote is more important than the language that accompanies it.
Indeed, Justices might write their opinions with one audience in mind, while voting
with a different mindset. To those reading his opinion, Justice Randolf was an antislavery crusader; to Mr. Williams, however, the New Jersey Justice was part of the white
establishment perpetuating the crime.
Perhaps we can analogize from People v. Post to cases like Screws and Gertz. In
Screws, Justice Rutledge appears to be the defender of civil rights. His preferred outcome
of the case is to send Mr. Screws directly to prison, without the possibility for a new
trial. For this, promoters of civil rights might commend him. However, his vote shows a
different side of the race issue. Mr. Screws, a white police officer, is given a second
chance to make his case to a jury. Should this new jury – which was probably all white –
acquit Mr. Screws, Mr. Hall’s murder would go unpunished. [Incidentally, the jury did
acquit Mr. Screws, who later went on to serve in the Georgia Senate.65] For all his talk
about sending Mr. Screws directly to jail, Justice Rutledge is part of the problem,
interfering with the defense of civil rights.
Justice Rutledge, however, might want his cake and to eat it too. He might want
to be part of the system that perpetuates racial discrimination, while being lauded as a
defender of these rights. The lack of a majority on disposing the case provides Justice
Rutledge with the perfect cover. “Please,” he would say, “do not blame me if Mr. Screws
goes free. I did all I could to ensure he would remain in jail.” Meanwhile, all along he
was voting to remand the case for a new trial, hoping the new jury would release Mr.
Screws.
A similar attack can be made in Gertz, where Justice Blackmun switched his vote.
Justice Blackmun stated that he preferred to defend the freedom of the press by
adopting a recklessness standard. Consequently, newspapers across the country could
call him a hero. On the other hand, his vote is what matters, and the freedom of the
press is diluted in Gertz, since a majority – formed with Justice Blackmun – adopts a less
protective standard. One can speculate whether Justice Blackmun always hoped for a
lower standard and the lack of a majority to dispose the case gave him an opportunity to
mask his true preferences.66
While Screws and Gertz can be viewed as self-serving “vote switches,” it is harder
to make the case in Green Tree.67 Class action arbitration between financial lenders and
banking institutions hardly raises an eyebrow in the popular press. Justice Stevens
Woodford Howard and Cornelius Bushoven, The “Screws” Case Revisited, 29 J. Politics 617, 633 (1967)
The Justices who switched their vote in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 410 (1954), were
more creative than Justices Rutledge and Stevens. In the United States Reports, the opinion of Justices
Frankfuter, Reed, Jackson, and Burton describes why these Justices prefer to affirm in the first person (e.g. “I
would” and “we vote”). Because of a deadlock, however, these four Justices switch their votes to remand.
The language of the opinion suddenly shifts from the first-person (“we”) to third-person (“therefore Justices
Frankfuter, Reed, Jackson, and Burton remand”). From the language of the opinion, it looks as if these
Justices fought for the positions they believe in, yet someone else has switched their votes to achieve a
majority. See also Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725 (1947) (use of the third person).
67 Indeed, whether repeat players could systematically abuse the Screws rule remains uncertain. Because of
the infrequent invocation of the rule, see note 5, the possibility remains.
65
66
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probably did not gain much praise for his statements about his preferred disposition of
the case, namely to affirm and allow class action arbitration. His vote switch probably
did not make a difference; the Bazzle and Lackey proceedings were remanded to the same
arbitrator who had already indicated a willingness to proceed on a class-wide basis.
Consequently, it does not seem Justice Stevens had anything to gain by voting to
remand, while claiming to prefer to uphold the state court decision.
Summary
To summarize briefly, the failure to achieve a majority on the disposition of a
case occurs in two contexts: unidimensional triple choice cases and multidimensional
triple choice cases. In some cases, however, Justices might claim a deadlock in order to
mask their true preferences and to receive praise for a willingness to adopt positions
they would not normally have adopted. While it is impossible to know when Justices are
masking their true beliefs, it is still possible that honest voting will lead to a three-way
deadlock between overturning, remanding, and upholding a lower court decision.
Consequently, the Screws rule governs some cases, even if it was artificially invoked in
Screws to make Justice Rutledge appear more of a defender of civil rights than he
actually was.
There are, of course, more arguments that one could make about the differences
between uni- and multidimensional triple choice cases. Part III, A. returns to the
differences; however, before addressing these arguments, it is important to understand
the alternatives to the Screws rule that have been suggested by commentators.

II.

Alternatives to the Screws Rule

There are some alternatives to the Screws rule. One could treat 3-4-2 deadlocks
like Screws as if they were 4-4 ties. When cases are tied, the decision below is affirmed by
inaction by the court above. Alternatively, one could remand the deadlocked case since
remanding is likely to be the middle position between upholding and overturning,
particularly in unidimensional cases like Gertz. Finally, one could let lower courts
discern, issue-by-issue, the holding of the court and to follow that holding when no
majority on the outcome is formed. This solution makes the most sense in
multidimensional cases like Screws and Green Tree.
Each of these alternatives is presented and critiqued against a standard of
strategyproofness, a term from the Economics literature. A rule is strategyproof if it
induces no members of the Court to change his or her votes. To understand the concept,
it is best to consider the rule governing ties. In certain circumstances, the rule induces
Justices to switch their vote to achieve a better outcome than they would have achieved
had they voted honestly.

A. The Exception Proves the Rule: The Case for Affirmation
1. The Rule
It is well established that when there is a tie, no action is taken by the court.68 The
rule is as old as the Supreme Court itself, dating back the Hayburn’s Case,69 a 1793
decision, and made explicit in The Antelope70 of 1825. In Durant v. Essex, Co.,71the Court
held:
68 Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 643, & n14 (2002)
(citing Durant v. Essex, Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 111 (1868)).
69 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). But see note 74.
70 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
71 73 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 111 (1868).

- 15 of 47 -

The Mechanics of Judicial Vote Switching

It has long been the doctrine in this country and in England, where
courts consist of several members, that no affirmative action can be
had in cause where the judges are equally divided in opinion as to the
judgment to be rendered of order to be made . . .. If the affirmative
action sought is to set aside or modify an existing judgment or order,
the division operates as a denial of the application, and the judgment
or order, stands in full force, to be carried into effect by the ordinary
means.
This requirement makes sense if one analogizes a court case to a bill before the
legislature. 72 Under the ancient rule, a motion requires a majority to pass.73 Failure to
achieve a majority in the legislature, like the Supreme Court, leads to no action by that
branch of government.74

2. Application to Triple Choice Cases
At first glance, the Durant rule does not explicitly apply to cases like Green Tree,
Gertz, and Screws. Unlike cases referred to in Durant, the Justices are divided into three
or more camps, not two. Furthermore, the Justices were not evenly divided; there were
more Justices who wanted to remand in Green Tree, for example, than there were who
wanted to overturn or uphold.
Commentators who believe that cases like Green Tree should be treated as ties
under the Durant rule75 could point to the faulty logic in Screws. Recall that in Screws,
Justice Rutledge justified switching his vote in order to achieve a majority disposition of
the case.76 In tie cases, however, no majority is required. Justices do not need to switch
their votes to avoid a tie; consequently, there is no reason for them to switch their votes
Others have argued that this analogy is inappropriate and that “A tie should not go to the executioner.”
Raymond Bonner, Three Abstain as Supreme Court Declines to Halt Texas Executions, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 2001
at A1. If one believes that the prosecutor has the burden of convincing the adjudicator every step of the
process, then this position seems sensible, although it is not the law.
73 Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 Va. L. Rev. 971, 1010
(1989)
74 Although a tied U.S. Supreme Court leads to no action, lower courts were once able to act instead. See Ex
Parte Holmes. 12 Vt. 631 (1840). After a tie at the U.S. Supreme Court (which under today’s default rule
would mean an affirmation of the Vermont Supreme Court decision), the Supreme Court of Vermont
reversed itself by a vote of 2-1. Chief Judge Williams began by pointing out that “I was detained from the
[Vermont Supreme C]ourt by sickness and took no part in [the Supreme Court of Vermont’s earlier]
deliberations, nor heard the arguments.” Id. at 634. Jumping in after much of the action, the Chief Judge
began to analyze the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices. One U.S. Supreme Court Justices in
particular, argued the Vermont Chief Justice, would have changed his mind. Consequently, “Had the return
been as it now is, it is to be inferred, from [U.S. Supreme Court Justice Catron’s] opinion, he would have
concurred with the other justices, and the judgment of this court would have been reversed.” Id. at 641.
Consequently, “a majority of [the U.S. Supreme Court] would have decided that Holmes was entitled to his
discharge, and that the opinion of a majority of the [S]upreme [C]ourt of the United States was also adverse
to the exercise of the [Governor’s] power in question.” Id.
Vermont Supreme Court Judge Redfield, concurring in the result, surprisingly conceded that the 4-4 tie in
the U.S. Supreme Court “virtually, although not formally, reversed” the earlier Supreme Court of Vermont
decision. Id. at 642-645. Similarly, Judge Bennett, dissenting, also did not challenge the Vermont court’s
reading of the Supreme Court’s tied vote. Id. at 647. The Vermont court, therefore, seemed to believe that a
tie in the U.S. Supreme Court does not necessarily mean an affirmation of the decision below. Rather, the
default rule from Ex Parte Holmes seems to suggest a re-trial rather than an affirmation.
75 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, “Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts,” 97 Mich. L.
Rev. 2297, 2313 n 51 (1999)
76 See text accompanying note 59
.
72
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to achieve a majority disposition in three-way deadlocks. The lack of a majority in Green
Tree, Gertz, and Screws should also be treated as a deadlock and therefore an affirmation.
There is an additional Public Choice argument why 3-4-2 deadlocks like Screws
should be treated the same way 4-4 ties are treated under Durant. To understand why,
imagine a hypothetical court in which three judges are called Uphold, Overturn,
Remand and vote as their names suggest.
Because there is a 1-1-1 split in this court, Justice Uphold can act strategically. By
refusing to vote, she can change a 1-1-1 deadlock into a 1-1 tie between Justice Overturn
and Justice Remand. When the court is evenly divided, it is deadlocked and the decision
below is affirmed. Thus, Justice Uphold, by abstaining, will get the outcome she desires
if lower courts interpret the tie pursuant to Durant.
Since we do not want Justices to abstain from participating in court proceedings
for strategic purposes, we might want to treat deadlocks in the same way we treat ties.
That is, in both situations, we need to uphold the decision below. If we do not, we will
induce Justices to act strategically to achieve the outcome they desire. Thus, Durant
either (1) mandates that deadlocks like Green Tree be treated like ties or (2) encourages
abstentions.

3. Strategic Behavior
i. Steps Around the Durant Rule
The Durant tie rule encourages strategic behavior. Consider the Freedom of the
Press case of Gertz, but instead imagine that the Justices were instead tied 4-4 between
remanding the case (under a middle-of-the-road standard) and overturning the lower
court decision (under an absolute freedom position).
Under Durant, this tie should lead to an affirmation of the lower court decision,
despite the injustice of the situation. All eight Justices believed the press was entitled to
more protection than it received at trial, yet a 4-4 tie would mean an affirmation of the
state court’s decision offering no protections. Thus Durant seems inappropriate when
the tie is between Justices voting to overturn and Justices voting to remand.
In all likelihood, one Justice would switch his or her vote to avoid the injustice in
this situation. Either a Justice who voted to overturn would vote to remand with a
middle-of-the-road standard in the hypothetical Gertz tie, or a Justice who voted to
remand would vote for a reversal under an absolute immunity standard. A tie would
therefore be avoided.
There is evidence that judges actually bargain around the Durant rule. While one
can find cases of 4-4 ties where the Court is divided between upholding and
overturning, or between remanding and upholding, I have been unable to find a case of
a 4-4 tie between judges who favor remanding and judges who favor overturning.
Simply put, one of the Justices will switch his or her vote clandestinely to prevent the
imposition of the Durant rule affirming the decision below.77
The same behavior can be seen in the three-way deadlock cases. Consider the
case of Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing.78 In Cushing, Justices Frankfuter, Reed, Jackson
and Burton voted to overturn the judgment, while Justices Black, joined by the Chief
Justice, Justices Douglas and Minton, voted to affirm. Justice Clark, however, voted to

77
78

Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 643 (2002)
347 U.S. 409, 410 (1954)
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remand the case to determine certain questions on liability. Thus, the Justices were
divided 4-1-4 between overturning, remanding, and upholding, respectively.
Although the 4-1-4 deadlock in Cushing is different from the hypothetical 4-4 tie
in Gertz, there is still an opportunity for strategic behavior. Justice Clark, voting to
remand, and the four Justices who vote to overturn the case, have an incentive to
negotiate around the default rule affirming the case. Instead of clandestinely changing
their votes, however, Justices Frankfuter, Reed, Jackson and Burton explicitly switch
from overturning and vote with Justice Clark to affirm “[i]n order to break the deadlock
resulting from the differences of opinion within the Court and to enable a majority to
dispose of this litigation.” The majority prevents an affirmation by deadlock, which is
what five Justice prefer. In Cushing and other cases, therefore, Justices who want to
overturn the lower court decision switch to remand the case in order to avoid an
affirmation.
In two lower court decisions, the switch operates in reverse. In People v. Harris79
and Riley v. Taylor,80 a California Supreme Court Justice and a Third Circuit Judge,
respectively, both switched from remanding the case to overturning it. In both cases, the
adjudicators may have acted to avoid an affirmation by deadlock. Thus Harris and Riley
are similar to Cushing in that the adjudicator acted to avoid an affirmation by deadlock
under Durant, but the direction of the switch was different.81
ii. Steps around the Steps around Durant
Screws and Green Tree differ from Cushing, Harris, and Riley in that the Justices
who voted to affirm switched their vote to remand. At first, these cases seem to
contradict the analysis above. There would be no reason for Justice Rutledge or Justice
Stevens to switch their votes; had they stuck to their guns, the case would have been
affirmed (which is the outcome they state they prefer).
The behavior in Screws and Green Tree, therefore, can be seen as a reaction to the
potential behavior exhibited in Harris and Riley. Recall that in Green Tree Justice Stevens
claimed that Justice Breyer’s decision remanding the case was closer to his own views.
Imagine for a moment that Justice Breyer had threatened to switch to overturning. Had
he done so, he would have joined the adjudicators in Harris and Riley in switching from
remanding to overturning.
Justice Stevens, however, did not want Justice Breyer to switch his vote to
overturn. To avoid having a situation like Harris and Riley, Justice Stevens offers Justice
Breyer a deal: if Justice Breyer agrees not to switch to overturning, Justice Stevens will
agree to switch to remand. The same holds true in Screws and the other cases in which
Justices switch from affirming to remanding.
To briefly summarize the seemingly complex interactions, the Durant tie rule:
(I)
Induces those who want to affirm to abstain and force a tie, which in turn;
(II)
Induces
(a)
Those who want to overturn to switch their votes to remand to
avoid an affirmation (Cushing), or

26 Cal. 3d (1984).
277 F.3d 261 (2001).
81 Cf. Edward A. Hartnett, “Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States,” 44 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 643, 669
(2002) (suggesting that an “affirmed by a deadlocked Court” rule in triple choice cases and predicting that
“Justices would rebel at its results and evade it”).
79
80
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(b)

Those who want to remand to switch their vote to overturn to
avoid an affirmation (Harris and Riley) which in turn;
(III)
Induces those who want to affirm to switch their votes to avoid situations
like Harris and Riley (Screws and Green Tree).82
To avoid explaining their strategic behavior, the Justices hide behind the need for
a “controlling judgment.” The great irony is that the lack of a controlling judgment
under the Durant rule induces the vote switching, which leads to the claim that a
controlling judgment is needed under Screws. Simply put, the initial reaction that cases
like Screws should be treated the same way ties are treated puts the cart before the horse.
The fact that ties are treated as affirmations induces Justices to switch their votes in the
first place. Later, Justices justify their actions as necessary to achieve a majority. The cure
– affirmation – is actually the disease.83
iii. Steps around the Steps around the Steps
around Durant
The astute reader might anticipate further deals and other possible vote-swaps.
To avoid a remand, for example, the Justices who want to overturn might switch their
votes to upholding. Similarly, Justices who want to overturn might switch their vote to
uphold to avoid remanding. These possibilities are discussed in Part III; C., which reconsiders the argument that deadlocks, should be treated as ties. But before turning to
that issue, one should consider other solutions offered by commentators to the rule.

B. Split the Difference: The Case for Remand
Judge John Roger, the first academic to systematically analyze vote switching at
the Supreme Court level, succinctly noted that “[i]n these situations it makes sense for
the ‘middle’ [namely remand] position to obtain.” Indeed, in every case in which a U.S.
Supreme Justice switched to achieve a majority, the switch was towards remand. Thus
in practice, the Screws rule appears to be a rule in favor of remanding, at least at the
Supreme Court level.
There is something very appealing about this argument. In the unidimensional
cases, it seems to make sense to split the difference. Recall how the Justices in Gertz fell
along a spectrum. Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan voted to uphold with protective
standards of absolute immunity and recklessness, respectively. On the other end of the
spectrum, Justices Burger and White voted to reverse, deferring to state law. Finally,
Justice Powell and three other Justices were in the middle requiring proof of fault. These
Justices voted to remand the case.
In this context, the “middle” decision requiring proof of fault is probably a good
compromise position. If asked to decide between a rule requiring proof of fault or a less82 To analogize to chess, Justice Uphold can put the Court in check by abstaining. In response, Justice
Overturn could defend by moving to remand. Alternately, Justice Remand could defend Justice Overturn by
switching to overturn. To counter this defense, Justice Uphold could neutralize Justice Remand by offering
herself to remand. This analysis assumes that the Justices are aligned along a spectrum and that those who
vote to uphold least prefer overturning and vice versa. This assumption is relaxed in Part III, C.
83 Dean Saul Levmore predicts similar bargaining, however, around a “narrowest-majority” default rule
instead of an affirmation default rule. Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 Theoretical
Inq. L. 87, 105 (2002). The result is the same no matter which default rule one uses. For the purposes of this
Article, the affirmation default rule discussed in Part II.A. is preferred because it is easier for the Supreme
Court Justices to know which position is an affirmation (and thus the default to negotiate around) than it is
for them to know which one is Dean Levmore’s “narrowest-majority.” For a further discussion of Dean
Levmore’s “narrowest-majority” approach, see Part III.C.
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protective state law standard, Justices Douglas and Brennan would probably prefer the
so-called “middle” position. Conversely, Justices Burger and White would also prefer
the “middle” position, requiring fault, to either an absolute immunity standard or one
that applied the standard of recklessness from New York Times.84 The result makes sense.
The case of Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, however, demonstrates a fundamental
weakness in Judge Roger’s suggestion that remanding is a “middle” position.85 Recall
from above that the case of Green Tree involved two different proceedings: the Bazzle
proceedings in which the state court certified the class, and the Lackey proceedings in
which the arbitrator made an independent determination to proceed with class action
arbitration.
To understand why remand is not a “middle” position in Green Tree imagine that
two different states had heard the two cases. In South Carolina, only the case of Green
Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle is heard, and the state court certifies the class for arbitration. In a
fictional state of East Carolina, however, the case of Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Lackey is
directly sent to an arbitrator. Assume that the East Carolina courts sent the case to
arbitration believing that the Federal Arbitration Act applies to state court proceedings
and pre-empts a state court’s interpretation of a private arbitration agreement. Both
cases are appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In the East Carolina case of Lackey, Chief Justice Rehnquist would vote to
overturn the decision of the state court. Like the contract in Bazzle, the contract in Lackey
expressly precludes the availability of class arbitration procedures. As such, the decision
to give the arbitrator the power to proceed on a class-wide basis was clearly erroneous.
The state court should have prevented the class arbitration proceedings. Consequently,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by two other Justices, would dispose of Lackey the same
way they disposed of Bazzle.
Justice Breyer would treat Lackey differently than he would treat Bazzle. The East
Carolina courts in Lackey had done exactly what he wanted them to do by requiring that

84 Those familiar with Public Choice jargon will recognize that the “middle” position in these situations in
the Condorcet winner. For more discussion on this issue, see Part III, C. But see Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261
(2001) (3rd Cir. 2001) (vote switching away from remand); People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 71 (1984) (same).
85 There are two other problems. The first problem is evident from a closer reading of Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion in which he goes to great lengths to attack Justice Breyer’s decision to remand the case. More than
half of the opinion focuses on the question of whether remand is proper (an issue with which he disagrees
with Justice Breyer), while less than half of the opinion is devoted to his disagreement with Justice Stevens’
decision to uphold the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision.
While it is true that Justice Breyer’s opinion came to command a majority and is thus more deserving of
scrutiny, it seems strange to suggest that the Chief Justice prefers Justice Breyer’s position to Justice Steven’s
position. It is possible that the Chief Justice, an advocate of state’s rights, would prefer to uphold the state
court’s decision than to remand the case to an arbitrator.
A similar concern could be raised in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). The dissenters criticize the decision
to remand the case. Id. (“If he can stand the emotional and financial burden, there is reason to hope that he
will recover damages for the reckless and irresponsible assault upon himself and his family which this
article represents. But he has litigated this case for 11 years. He should not be subjected to the burden of a
new trial without significant cause. This does not exist.”).
There is a final problem. If the Justices prefer the “middle” position to be the default rule, there is no reason
they should be switching to remand. In other words, if the default is always to remand, the Justices do not
need to switch their votes to achieve it. The dissenters could simply say: “And since we are divided and the
default rule is to remand, we agree that that the case should be remanded.” Thus there is no need for the
Screws rule if Justices just want to split the difference and remand.
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an arbitrator decide the question of class action arbitration. Consequently, he and three
other Justices would vote to uphold Lackey ,while remanding Bazzle.
Justice Thomas would also treat Lackey differently from Bazzle. According to
Justice Thomas, “the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to proceedings in state
court” and it does not “pre-empt[ ] a state court’s interpretation of a private arbitration
agreement.” The East Carolina Supreme Court, consequently, incorrectly held that the
FAA mandates sending the case to an arbitrator. To determine what the state law is on
this issue, Justice Thomas would remand the case to the state courts for further
proceedings. While Justice Thomas would vote to remand the Lackey case, he would vote
to uphold the Bazzle proceedings.
To summarize the distinction, if the Bazzle and Lackey cases arose independently,
the Justices would have voted as follows:
Green Tree v. Bazzle Green Tree v. Lackey
Court decision
Arbitrator decision
Rehnquist: No class arbitration
Overturn
Overturn
Breyer: Arbitrator must interpret
Remand
Uphold
Thomas: Court should interpret
Uphold
Remand
In the Bazzle case, Justice Breyer adopted the “middle” position of remand.
Because the South Carolina Supreme Court decided to impose class arbitration
procedures under state law, Justice Breyer – by sending the case to an arbitrator – was
“in between” the Chief Justice voting to reverse, and Justice Thomas voting to affirm.
However, in Lackey, Justice Thomas adopted the “middle” position of remand. Because
the East Carolina Supreme Court decided to empower an arbitrator to decide whether to
have class action arbitration, Justice Thomas – by sending the case back the Supreme
Court to determine the issue under state law – was “in between” the Chief Justice voting
to reverse, and Justice Breyer voting to affirm. This seems like an odd result.
Because of the arbitrariness of the distinction, courts and commentators should
reconsider arguments that remand is the “middle” position that best splits the difference
between affirming and overturning the lower court ruling. Compared to the rule
affirming all cases, the “middle” position rule seems less satisfying since it will, as just
demonstrated, sometimes mean the opposite of what the lower court had done.
It is worth pausing to note how this analysis helps resolve one of the peculiarities
in the Green Tree cases. Recall that Justice Breyer went to great length to suggest that the
arbitrator’s decision was tainted by the South Carolina state court’s decision and that the
case must be remanded for an arbitrator’s re-determination. The parties, however, did
not litigate the independence of the arbitrator’s decision, and courts generally do not
upset arbitrator’s determinations as easily as Justice Breyer upset the decision in Lackey.
One reason Justice Breyer may have acted as he did was to prevent the
dichotomy discussed above. Had Justice Breyer remanded the Bazzle case but upheld the
Lackey case, there would be a contradiction. Justice Thomas’s position would be the
“middle” position in Lackey, while Justice Breyer would be the “middle” position in
Bazzle. The “middle” position in Lackey would require remanding the case to a court
while the “middle” position in Bazzle would require remanding the case to an arbitrator.
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The reasoning would be circular. Justice Breyer may have acted strategically to achieve
the outcome he desired and to avoid the circularity.86
Thus, while Justice Breyer might have responded to Judge Rogers’ intuition that
remanding is the default rule, remanding deadlocks will lead to arbitrary results. The
“middle” remand solution might be entirely based on the disposition of the case below.
The astute reader might anticipate a way of avoiding this problem by seeking the
“middle” position in unidimensional cases and going issue-by-issue in multidimensional cases. Part III, A. discusses the difficulties in differentiating the two types of
cases, but first this Article comments on problems inherent in a system of issue-by-issue
voting.

C. The Old Way: The Case for Issue-By-Issue
1. Origins and Example
In 1774, the House of Lords heard the case of Donaldson v. Becket,87 a significant
copyright case that is still cited as authority today. Thomas Becket, a Scottish bookseller,
purchased the copyright to The Seasons after the death of the author. Alexander and John
Donaldson, however, refused to recognize Becket’s copyright and printed an
unauthorized edition of The Seasons. Becket sued for an injunction, which was granted,
and Donaldson appealed all the way to the House of Lords.88
The House of Lords, the highest court in the United Kingdom, asked a group of
eleven distinguished judges from the King’s Bench, Common Plea, and Exchequer to
help resolve three central issues in the case. Specifically, the House of Lords was
interested in: (I) whether the Common Law created copyright protections, (II) if such a
right existed, whether the right continues after publication, and (III) whether the Statute
of Anne “impeached, restrained, or [took] away” the Common Law protection. Becket’s
copyright depended on all three factors; the injunction required proof that a Common
Law right existed, that it continued after publication, and that the Statute of Ann did not
abridge copyrights.89
Confusion surrounds the holding of the court in Donaldson. First, American
courts and commentators treat the opinions of the eleven judges as the holding of the
decision. This is incorrect since the House of Lords, not the eleven judges, ultimately
voted to lift the injunction against Donaldson. Next, four different reporters counted the
votes of the eleven judges, and differences in the tallies exist between the four reporters.
Burrow’s Reports and Brown’s Parliamentary Cases, the two most cited reports, both
indicate that a six to five majority believed a perpetual copyright existed at Common
Law, but that the Statute of Anne “impeached” these copyrights. The Anonymous Report
and The Gentleman’s Report, indicate a different tally. 90 The latter reporters expose
another level of confusion in the opinion, never explored in the Copyright literature, and
offer insight into the origins of the Screws rule and a plausible alternative to it.
Justice Thomas cannot remand the Lackey case to the South Carolina Supreme Court. In effect, the case
was already decided by a court in Bazzle, so remanding Lackey to the state courts would serve no function.
This procedural aspect of the case also helps avoid the contradiction – and perhaps the brevity of Justice
Thomas’ opinion.
87 4 Burr at 2408 (1774) [UK]. See also, Howard D. Abrams, “Historic Foundation of Copyright Law,” 29
Wayne L. Rev. 1119 (1983) (discussing the case).
88 See, generally, Abrams, “Historic Foundation of Copyright Law,” 29 Wayne L. Rev. 1119 (1983).
89 Id. at 1157 n 159 (discussing the five questions asked). I limit the discussion to the relevant three questions
that illustrate my point.
90 Id. at 1156-70.
86
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According to The Anonymous Report and The Gentleman’s Report, the eleven judges
were divided over how to dispose the case. First, Judge Blackstone, along with four
other judges, believed that Thomas Becket properly obtained an injunction. The
Common Law gave him a copyright, which was not abrogated by publication or by the
Statute of Anne.91
Judge Eyre, however, disagreed on all points. He voted that there was no
Common Law protection, that publication would end such a protection (assuming,
arguendo, it existed), and that the Statute of Anne limited the protection (again, assuming
arguendo it existed).92
The two reporters, The Anonymous Reports and The Gentleman’s Reports, show the
remaining judges divided between Judge Blackstone and Judge Eyre’s positions. Judges
Aston and Smith are recorded as voting that a Common Law right existed, but that it
ended after publication. Judges Gould and DeGray voted that the Statute of Anne
abrogated the Common Law rights, which existed before the statute. Finally, Judge
Prestoff agreed that the Statute of Anne abrogated the Common Law right, but voted
that no Common Law right existed in the first place.93

2. Doctrinal Paradoxes
A chart best shows the positions of the judges according to The Anonymous Report
and The Gentleman’s Report:
Common Law: End by Publication:
Ended by Statute: Outcome:
Blackstone +4
Yes
No
No
Copyrights
Eyre
No
Yes
Yes
No rights
Prestoff
No
No
Yes
No rights
Aston/Smith
Yes
Yes
No
No rights
Gould/DeGrey
Yes
No
Yes
No rights
9-2 Yes
8-3 No
7-4 No
6-5 No rights94
An anomaly exists. Begin with the three issues presented. A majority of nine to
two believes that the Common Law creates a protection. Similarly, a majority of eight to
three believes that the copyright continues after publication, while a majority of seven to
four believes that the Statute of Anne did not abrogate the Common Law. Looking issueby-issue, one might expect the eleven judges to agree that the injunction should be
sustained.
Now look at the outcomes for which the judges would vote. Only Judge
Blackstone, joined by four other judges, believed that Donaldson’s injunction should
stand. Judges Eyre and Prestoff do not feel there was a Common Law copyright; Judges
Aston and Smith believe that the right ends at publication; and Judges Gould and
DeGrey believe that the Statute of Anne abrogated it. Consequently, these six judges
would vote to overturn the injunction.
Because of this contradiction, a “doctrinal paradox” exists.95 Voting issue-byissue leads to a different result than voting based on outcome. One solution to the Screws

Id. at 1188-91.
Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Lewis A. Kornauser and Lawrence G. Sage, “The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts,” 81
Calif. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1993).
91
92
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problem is to forget outcome voting (since it results in a three-way deadlock and no
resolution) and to instead embrace issue-by-issue voting.

3. Issue-by-Issue Voting: Benefits & Drawbacks
i. Benefits of Issue-By-Issue Voting
Commentators who prefer issue-by-issue voting to outcome voting point to the
serious flaws with outcome voting. First, outcome voting is susceptible to “pathdependence.” Imagine that the House of Lords was asked to determine each question
independently and asked the eleven judges for their opinions on each issue separately.
For example, in the hypothetical case of Abraham v. Becket, the judges would be asked to
determine whether a Common Law copyright exists (they would find that it does). In
another hypothetical case of Becker v. Becket, the judges would be asked whether the
right ends at publication (they would find that it does not). Finally, in Chastleton v.
Becket, they would be asked whether the Statute of Anne ends the protection (they
would find that it does not). If Donaldson were to arise after Abraham (Common Law
rights), Becker (protections continue after publication), and Chastleton (protections not
abrogated by Statute of Anne), Donaldson would come out differently by way of stare
decisis. The judges, following precedence, would vote to uphold the injunction. But
because Donaldson arose before Abraham, Becker, and Chastleton, the outcome was
different. Issue-by-issue voting avoids this problem.96
Next, issue-by-issue voting gives guidance to lower courts. American courts,
interpreting Donaldson, now know the positions of each judge on the three issues. By
tallying the judge’s votes, a lower court can determine from Donaldson how Abraham
(Common Law), Becker (affect of publishing), and Chastleton (abrogation of Statute of
Anne) should be decided. Donaldson would not be able to govern these cases under an
outcome based voting system. 97
The final, and perhaps most obvious reason, to resort to issue-by-issue voting in
the Screws context is that outcome voting has failed to achieve a result. Going through
the opinions in Screws and Green Tree might help lower courts figure out what the
holding of the Court is in these cases.
ii. Problems with Issue-By-Issue Voting
There are many problems with issue-by-issue voting, only several of which I will
discuss here.
a. Inapplicability to Unidimensional Case
First, issue-by-issue fails to resolve unidimensional cases. In Gertz, the Justices
were asked to resolve one issue, and were divided three ways on the disposition of the
case because of that single issue. Issue-by-issue voting does not help resolve these cases.
As mentioned briefly above, one could imagine treating unidimensional cases
differently from multidimensional cases; Part III, A. shows why this is not a viable
option.

See, e.g. Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, “Unpacking the Court,” 96 Yale L. J. 82, 115 (1982)
(“One may then prefer issue-by-issue decisionmaking because it advances coherence.”). Post and Salop, 80
Geo. L. J. at 762 (“Outcome-voting leads to just this kind of fundamental path dependence.”).
97 David Post and Steven C. Salop, Rowing against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80
Geo. L. J. 743, 763 (1992); Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sage, “The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts,” 81 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 40 (1993).
96
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b. Issue Avoidance
The second problem is that issue-by-issue voting encourages Justices to avoid
voting on certain issues.98 Take the case of Green Tree. While a majority of the Justices (1)
believed the FAA applies to the states, a different majority (2) believed the contract was
ambiguous, and a third majority (3) agreed that the case should not be remanded, we do
not know whether there was a majority on a fourth question: did the South Carolina
courts get the contract interpretation correct. Justice Breyer simply does not get to that
issue, thus preventing issue-by-issue determination of the case.99
The same result is seen in Screws. A majority of the Justices believed that Mr.
Screws had acted under the color of state law; a different majority agreed that the
statute’s unconstitutional aspects could be resolved by judicial modification of the
statute. On the third issue, whether the error was harmless, Justice Roberts, joined by
two other Justices, simply do not cast a vote. Similar problems emerge in the recording
of the votes in Donaldson.
The Justices in many cases realize that they are denying a majority on the final
question. In Screws, for example, Justice Roberts decided to discuss the second issue
raised by the case because a majority disagreed with his position on the first issue. He
stops, however, after the second issue. Justice Roberts should have, along similar lines,
moved to the third issue of the case (whether the error was harmless) instead of
remaining silent. Yet he did not.
Perhaps the Justices are acting strategically.100 Assume in Screws that Justice
Roberts believed the error was not harmless and that he would add his votes and
achieve a majority finding the error did affect Mr. Screws’ rights. As a result, although
Justice Roberts prefers overturning Mr. Screw’s conviction, his votes on the final issue in
the case would lead to upholding the conviction using issue-by-issue voting! By failing to
reach the harmlessness of the error, therefore, Justice Roberts prevents a majority from
forming to uphold the case.
The same might be true in Green Tree. Justice Breyer believes the case should be
remanded to an arbitrator, although a majority of the Court disagrees with this position.
The next issue to naturally arise would be whether the courts in South Carolina properly
interpreted the contract. By not voting on this last issue, Justice Breyer denies the Chief
Justice, and the three Justices joining his opinion; and Justice Stevens and Thomas and
opportunity to claim victory using issue-by-issue voting. Had Justice Breyer voted that
the South Carolina Supreme Court got the contract interpretation incorrect (which is
what I understand Justice Breyer to believe),101 a majority would favor applying the FAA

98 Post and Salop, 80 Geo. L. J. at 756 (“Outcome-voting, it is argued, best serves the interest of judicial
economy by allowing judges to avoid reaching, and analyzing, certain issues once they have resolved one of
the dispositive issues in a particular way.”).
99 Supra Part I. B.
100 Perhaps an explicit issue-by-issue rule would force the Justices to reveal their positions. Were the merits
of such a rule to be debated, those Justices who have been hiding their positions on particular issues would
have an incentive to prevent the issue-by-issue rule from becoming the default rule. As discussed below in
Part II.B., any submajority could thwart deliberation over the default rule.
101 I believe so for two reasons. First, Justice Breyer distanced himself from the South Carolina decision
allowing class arbitration. He wrote, “we cannot accept the South Carolina Supreme Court decision in its
entirety.” Id. Next, Justice Breyer’s treatment of the Lackey proceedings suggests he dislikes imposing class
arbitration when the contract is ambiguous. Recall that in Lackey the arbitrator determined that there should
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to the states, a different majority would find that the contract was ambiguous, and a
third majority would find that there is no need to remand the case. On the final question,
Justice Breyer would provide the Chief Justice with a majority in favor of overturning
the decision below. Conversely, had Justice Breyer believed that the contract
interpretation was correct, he would provide Justices Stevens and Thomas a majority in
favor of upholding, using issue-by-issue voting.102
c. Vote Switching within Issues
The final problem raised in this Part of the Article involves the strategic behavior
issue-by-issue voting creates vis-à-vis the substantive issues raised in the case. Recall
from above the breakdown in the Donaldson case:
Common Law: End by Publication:
Ended by Statute: Outcome

be class action arbitration. For this reason, Justice Breyer should have voted to affirm the arbitrator’s
decision.
Why, then, did Justice Breyer remand the Lackey decision back to the arbitrator? One argument is that Justice
Breyer did not like the outcome reached by the arbitrator, and his creative lawyering on this issue gives the
arbitrator a second chance to come to the right conclusion. That is, Justice Breyer is telling the arbitrator not
to be influence by the South Carolina Supreme Court decision (which allowed class action arbitration), and
the arbitrator might interpret the instruction to re-interpret the contract as an indication that Justice Breyer
disproves of the earlier result.
102 There are several ways to resolve the difficulty of Justices not voting on issues to prevent an outcome
they do not desire, although no solution satisfactory addresses all cases. First, one might suggest that if there
is no majority on a particular issue (e.g. Justice Breyer remains silent), the position of the lower court should
be affirmed. The problem with affirming if there is no majority on any particular issue is that often the lower
court does not reach the issues raised on appeal. In Screws, for example, the lower courts did not have to
reach the harmlessness of the error. Affirmation of a lower court’s decision on an issue might be impossible.
The next solution would involve predicting how the Justices would have voted on the remaining issue. That
is, one could force a “yes” or “no” into every column even though the adjudicator did not reach that issue.
See supra n 101. Donaldson demonstrates the problem with making such predictions. The four reporters of
the case all tried to figure out how judges would have voted on issues that the judges did not reach in their
opinions. Contradictions resulted, and modern American Copyright law might have been very different had
a different reporter been used to interpret the effects of the Statute of Anne on Common Law copyrights.
A third solution to the non-voting Justices phenomenon is to apply Durant’s requirement that a moving
party must achieve a majority to be successful. Thus, if there were no majority in Green Tree over whether
the state court’s interpretation of the contract was correct, the case should be affirmed since Green Tree
Financial Corp. had the burden of convincing a majority of the Justices on each issue.
The first problem with this argument is that Green Tree might have successfully convinced a majority of the
Justices on this point. Recall from above that Justice Breyer might have disagreed with the South Carolina
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the contract. Supra n 101. If so, Green Tree should be successful because it
achieved a majority, yet Justice Breyer’s silence (to avoid overturning the decision according to issue-byissue voting) leads to an affirmation (which also is not what Justice Breyer wants). Consequently, the rule
would corner Justices into making decisions they would rather not make.
In addition, sometimes requiring a majority on every issue would lead to difficulties in determining who
has a burden on particular issues. Take Screws as an example. In Screws, a majority held that the statute was
unconstitutional, a victory for Mr. Screws. The Court, however, then went on to hold that the
unconstitutionality could be rectified by judicial intervention, a victory for the prosecution. The final issue
raised was whether the error in not using the new standard was harmless; if it were, the conviction could be
upheld, if it were not, there would have to be a new trial. It is unclear in this context which party has the
burden of convincing a majority on the final issue.
Finally, just as issues can be avoided, other issues can be added to change the outcome of a case. John M.
Rogers, Appellate Court Voting Rights: “Issue Voting” by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Response to Some
Radical Proposals, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 997 (1996) (lists about 15 issues that came up in Tidewater and shows how
outcome depends on which questions you ask). Part III, A. discusses this phenomenon in more detail by
showing how unidimensional cases can be transformed into multidimensional cases.
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Blackstone +4
Eyre
Prestoff
Aston/Smith
Gould/DeGrey

Yes
No
No
Copyrights
No
Yes
Yes
No rights
No
No
Yes
No rights
Yes
Yes
No
No rights
Yes
No
Yes
No rights
9-2 Yes
8-3 No
7-4 No
6-5 No rights
If the outcome of the case were determined issue-by-issue, Judges Prestoff,
Gould, DeGrey, Aston and Smith would have an incentive to switch their votes. Recall
(from the right-most column) that all of these judges prefer to prevent recovery for a
copyright in this case. Issue-by-issue voting, however, would lead to a recovery.
Judges Prestoff, Gould and DeGrey can prevent recovery by switching their
votes on whether or not publication ends the Common Law copyright. Should they
switch their vote, the current 8-3 majority protecting copyrights would turn into a 6-5
majority ending them. Similarly, if Judges Aston and Smith were to change their vote on
the effects of the Statute of Anne, a 7-4 majority finding the Statute had no effect on
copyright protections would become a 6-5 majority staying that it did.
If judges are more concerned about the outcome of a case than any particular
issue that affects the outcome, issue-by-issue voting will encourage judges to
clandestinely change their votes on particular issues to reach the outcomes they desire.
The Screws rule might be preferable because it encourages the changes to take place
openly instead of clandestinely as occurs under issue-by-issue voting.
Summary
This Part of the Article identified three alternatives to the Screws rule requiring a
majority disposition of cases. The first alternative, treating three-way deadlocks as
affirmations, generates multiple problems. Justices who do not want the case to be
upheld will negotiate around the default rule; either Justices who want to overturn will
switch to remand or Justices who want to remand will switch to overturn. Similarly, it
may induce Justices who want to uphold the lower court’s decision to switch to remand
to prevent an overturning. Consequently, it is more useful to consider the affirmation
solution as the source of the problem in Screws.
The next solution involves remanding every case as the “middle” position
between upholding and overturning. While this makes the most sense in
unidimensional cases, it is not clear that remand is always the “middle” position in
multidimensional cases. Green Tree demonstrates that Justices will engage in “creative
lawyering” (that is, strategic behavior) to ensure that their decisions are the “middle”
position of the Justices.
Finally, commentators have argued that in cases like Screws courts should look
issue-by-issue to determine whether a majority exists. This solution induces Justices to
(1) avoid issues or (2) switch their votes on particular issues to achieve desired
outcomes.
Consequently, none of the three solutions offered in Part II are stradegyproof.103
Each induces Justices to switch their votes or engage in conduct that masks their true
preferences.

It might be worth mentioning another alternative. In 3-4-2, the plurality opinion with the greatest number
of votes might become the holding of the Court. The obvious problem with this solution is that it does not
resolve 4-4-1, 1-4-4, or 4-1-4 or 3-3-3 splits.
103
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III.

A Meta-Analysis of the Screws Rule

If the analysis in Part II is correct, and (A) affirming all Screws-like cases, (B)
remanding them, and (C) engaging in issue-by-issue voting all induce the strategic
behavior and vote switching seen in Screws, one might wonder why the Screws rule
exists instead of one of the equally problematic alternatives offered in Part II. This Part
of the Article discusses the reasons why Screws arises.
The meta-analysis in this Part proceeds in three parts: First, it discusses whether
uni- and multidimensional cases should be treated differently. Specifically,
unidimensional cases could be solved using the “always affirm” or “always remand”
solutions discussed in Part II, while multidimensional cases could be resolved using
issue-by-issue voting. This solution, unfortunately, encourages additional strategic
behavior as Justices will try to squeeze multidimensional cases into a unidimensional
framework or will try to expand unidimensional cases into multidimensional cases.
Next, this Part of the Article addresses arguments that the Court should engage
in a “meta-vote” to determine which of the three standards discussed in Part II to apply.
That is, after Screws and Green Tree are decided with no vote switching, a subsequent U.S.
Supreme Court could determine whether to apply the “always affirm,” “always
remand” or issue-by-issue solution discussed above. Ironically, this solution to the
Screws problem actually demonstrates why Screws is a good rule. The Screws rule,
requiring a majority to dispose of the case when it is first adjudicated, prevents a metavote, which may result in chaotic reasoning in subsequent cases. Indeed, a submajority
of the Court can prevent a “meta-vote” by engaging in a vote switch.
Finally, lower courts could apply a modified version of the Marks rule to find the
“narrowest holding necessary to achieve a majority.” While there is no majority in 3-4-2
deadlocks like Screws (when there is no vote switching), a court still might be tempted to
try to find the “narrowest holding” that would have achieved a majority. This proposed
solution raises new concerns and demonstrate that the Screws rule cannot overcome
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.104 This portion of the Article will draw from arguments
made throughout this Article, but again, the focus is entirely descriptive and no solution
is necessarily better than the others.

A. Are Multidimensional Cases Just Unidimensional Cases in Sheep’s Skins?
By now, the reader might feel confident in at least one solution to the problem
identified above. Specifically, a court could use issue-by-issue adjudication only for
multidimensional cases. This limitation, while not perfect, resolves the problems posed
by unidimensional cases like Gertz. Meanwhile, the court could use a different standard
for unidimensional cases. For example, if a court applied the “always affirm” rule in
unidimensional cases, it could avoid problems posed by cases like Green Tree. Recall
from above that remanding the case to an arbitrator was only the “middle” position
because of procedural luck; had the Lackey proceedings came up independently, the
“middle” position would have involved remanding the case to a court.
The confidence in this solution is derived from the unnecessary reliance on an
artificial division between uni- and multidimensional cases in the literature. At first
glance, there are significant differences between the unidimensional triple choice cases,
which involve only one issue, and multidimensional cases, which involve more than

104

Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (2d Ed. 1963).
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one. Commentators have treated the two cases differently, listing cases separately and
perpetuating the confusion.105
Unfortunately, the differences are artificial. Multidimensional cases are just
unidimensional cases in sheep’s skins and vice-versa. 106 Begin with the unidimensional
case of Gertz. Recall that the Justices fell along the following spectrum:
Absolute Immunity
Recklessness
Proof of Fault
State Law
<-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->
Douglas
Brennan/Blackmun Powell +3
Burger + White
Uphold
Uphold
Remand
Reverse
Justice Blackmun switched his vote to remand, the “middle” position.
This is not the only way to approach the case. Indeed, Justice Brennan can
engage in creative lawyering to transform Gertz from a unidimensional case to a
multidimensional case. To understand how, consider the following steps:
(1)
First, Justice Brennan could propose the following vote: “Does a ‘proof
of fault’ standard have any Constitutional basis?” Only Justice Powell,
joined by three Justices, believed that it did.
(2)
Next, Justice Brennan can ask: “Should the Constitution provide
absolute rules to govern freedom of the press cases?” Clearly, Justice
Douglas believes that it does, but so do Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White. The last two adjudicators believed that the Constitution
provides one bright-line rule: state law applies.
(3)
Finally, Justice Brennan could ask the other Justices to vote on
whether there exists any protection of newspapers in the private
litigant context. Only the Chief Justice and Justice White believe that it
does not.
Consequently, Gertz could be transformed into a multidimensional case with the
following breakdown:
Douglas
Brennan/Blackmun Powell +3
Burger/White
(1) “Proof of Fault” No basis
No Basis
Constitutional No basis
(2) Absolute rule?
Yes
No
No
Yes
(3) Any protection? Yes
Yes
Yes
No
First, the Justices vote by a margin of 5-4 that the “proof of fault” standard has no
Constitutional basis. Next, by a margin of 7-2, they vote that the Constitution does not
require any absolute rules. Finally, the Justices vote by a margin of 7-2 that the
Constitution provides protections to the press.
The position of Justices Brennan and Blackmun is consistent with these votes.
Their position (requiring malice) is not an absolute rule, yet it provides some
Constitutional protections. Finally, it is not the “proof of fault” standard suggested by
Justice Powell.
My goal here is not to demonstrate that this creative lawyering is an appropriate
way to address the issues raised in Gertz. Rather my point is that treating
Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political Economy of Bush v.
Gore, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1849, (2001).
106 See Richard H. Pildes and Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value
Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121, 2163 (1990); Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell L.
Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political Economy ofBush v. Gore, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1849 (2001)
(demonstrating that Bush v. Gore can be viewed both as a unidimensional and multidimensional issue).
105
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unidimensional cases as remands while treating multidimensional cases under an issueby-issue rule encourages additional strategic behavior. Justice Powell will insist that
Gertz only raises one issue. If Gertz is unidimensional, the case will be remanded and
Justice Powell’s position will prevail. However, if multidimensional cases are treated
issue-by-issue, Justices Brennan and Blackmun will have an incentive to argue that Gertz
raises multiple issues.107.
On the other hand, multidimensional cases could be narrowed into a
unidimensional framework. Green Tree can serve as an example. Recall from above that
many issues were raised in the case. Justices Thomas and Stevens would uphold the
entire South Carolina Supreme Court decision. Justice Breyer, joined by three Justices,
however, disagreed with the state court’s determination of whether an arbitrator or a
court should construe arbitration contracts under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Chief
Justice, joined by two Justices, voted to overturn the South Carolina Supreme Court’s
determination of state contract law. Consider the following representation of the various
opinions:
Complete Agreement
Disagreement on Federal Issue
Disagreement on State Issue
<------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->

Stevens/Thomas
Breyer+3
Rehnquist+2
Uphold
Remand
Overturn
Placed along this unidimensional spectrum, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion
seems extreme. It overturns a state court determination of state contract law. Justice
Breyer’s opinion, which focuses on whether the Federal Arbitration Act requires certain
procedures, is more moderate in its reach. It only reviews the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s decision of federal law. Finally, Justices Thomas and Stevens are at the other
extreme, giving the state court the most leeway. Viewed in this manner, Green Tree is just
a run-of-the-mill unidimensional case that should be treated like Gertz.
Because of the potential to make Green Tree – a seemingly multidimensional case
– into a unidimensional case, strategic behavior exists. Recall from above that issue-byissue voting would probably result in overturning the state court decision (or
alternatively, in the affirmation of the state court holding). Justice Breyer wants neither
of these outcomes and may feel compelled to cast Green Tree as a unidimensional case.
Alternatively, the Chief Justice has an incentive to write his opinion as if it raises
multiple questions that have to be resolved. If the case were multidimensional, issue-byissue voting would probably lead to an outcome he desires.
To summarize, the differences between uni- and multidimensional cases are only
skin deep. Unidimensional cases like Gertz can be written in a way to suggest multiple
issues are involved. Conversely, multidimensional cases like Green Tree can be collapsed
to suggest that only one issue was present. Treating uni- and multidimensional cases
differently will induce Justices to draft their opinions to avoid – or invoke – a particular
outcome. Thus the solution only induces additional strategic behavior.
At this point, the reader might be frustrated. A rule requiring affirmation has
been shown to lead to strategic behavior. An “always remand” solution faces difficulties
Indeed, in a very well thought article, Professor Kalven demonstrates that Gertz is simply one piece of a
larger puzzle over the freedom of the press. Professor Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment,
Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 267 (demonstrating how multiple issues are involved). While it is
true that remanding the case to determine whether there was proof of fault appears to be the middle
position in this particular case, such a myopic view misses the broader ideologies of the Justices
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in the multidimensional context, while an issue-by-issue solution cannot govern
unidimensional cases. Now the reader learns that cases can be artificially transformed
from uni- to multidimensional and vice-versa. Frustrated, one might be tempted just to
throw one’s hands up and ask the Court to decide which rule to adopt. This is exactly
the next suggestion.

B. Engage in Meta-Voting
In their discussion of issue-by-issue voting and outcome-based voting, Professors
Kornhauser and Sage argued that a court should engage in a “meta-vote” to determine
when cases should be interpreted issue-by-issue and when cases should be interpreted
based on the votes of the Justices.108 Although their analysis does not deal with the
question of uni- or multidimensional triple choice cases like Gertz and Screws per se, it
might be helpful to consider their suggestion.
One of the problems with the Screws rule is that no majority of any Court has
ever adopted it. Indeed, it almost impossible for a majority of a Court to agree to the
vote-switch arrangement. Five Justices (a majority) will never face the need to switch
their votes to achieve a majority. Consequently, the Screws rule will be voted on by at
most four Justices of any Court.
The meta-vote would overcome this problem. In Green Tree I, for example, the
Justices could be asked to vote according to their preferences. Justice Stevens would not
have to switch his vote to achieve a majority disposition. Later, the case would be relitigated. First, a South Carolina trial court might interpret the 3-4-2 deadlock in Green
Tree I as an affirmation. The state Court of Appeals might reverse and treat the remand
position in Green Tree I as the holding. Finally, the South Carolina Supreme Court might
reverse the state Court of Appeals and decide that Green Tree I should be interpreted
using an issue-by-issue approach.
Assuming the U.S. Supreme Court grants a writ of certiorari in Green Tree II, it
will be asked to determine how to interpret the deadlock in Green Tree I. Thus, a metavote will be taken. The result might be easy. A majority of the Justices might agree with
the state trial court that the deadlock is an affirmation. Alternatively, a majority might
agree that the deadlock should be treated as a remand. Finally, the Justices might agree
that the case should be determined issue-by-issue.
But of course, that would be too easy. As hinted in scholarship by Judge
Rogers,109 there might not be a majority in Green Tree II on how Green Tree I should be
interpreted. For example, the Justices in Green Tree II might adopt the same the positions
they adopted in Green Tree I. Justices Stevens and Thomas might vote that Green Tree I
should be treated as an affirmation. Justice Breyer, however, might disagree. He and
three Justices might vote in Green Tree II that Green Tree I be treated as a remand. Finally,
the Chief Justice, joined by two Justices, might engage in issue-by-issue voting and will
find – as discussed above – that Justice Breyer provided a majority in favor of
overturning the South Carolina Supreme Court decision in Green Tree I.110
See Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sage, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81
Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1993) (saying metavote should happen)
109 See John M. Rogers, Appellate Court Voting Rights: “Issue Voting” by Multimember Appellate Courts: A
Response to Some Radical Proposals, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 997 (1996) (“Should there be issue voting or outcome
voting on the metavote? ... Nightmares of infinite regression are conceivable.”).
110 Thus, Green Tree II might suffer from the same 3-4-2 deadlock exhibited in Green Tree I. Of course, the
Justices might be switched around a little. Justice O’Connor might vote one way in Green Tree I, yet join a
108
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Should there be a deadlock in Green Tree II, the Justices appear stuck. Green Tree
II was supposed to resolve how cases like Green Tree I (and, now, also Green Tree II) are
to be interpreted. Green Tree II, consequently, exhibits an element of self-reflection; it was
meant to decide how to treat itself, but is unable to do so. Furthermore, litigation could
continue indefinitely. The meaning of Green Tree II (and therefore Green Tree I) might be
re-litigated until Green Tree III arises. However, there are no assurances that Green Tree
III will provide a majority disposition, et cetera.111
To prevent this chain of events, one Justice in Green Tree I, Justice Stevens,
switched his vote. In a sense, Justice Stevens has a judicial veto that prevents Green Tree
II from arising out of the deadlock of Green Tree I. And at most, only two Justices are
needed to prevent Green Tree I from being re-litigated in Green Tree II. Thus, a
submajority of the Court can prevent subsequent litigation of Green Tree I.112
Consequently, the argument that a meta-vote should occur actually offers a
justification for the Screws rule instead of one of the alternatives discussed in Part II. The
existence of alternative ways to treat cases like Screws might induce discussion of a
meta-vote. The possibility that the Court would be deadlocked in the meta-vote (just as
it was deadlocked in the original case), however, might induce Justices to switch their
votes earlier rather than later.

C. TheMarks Rule and the Holding of the Court
Although vote switching prevents problems caused by a subsequent meta-vote
between the three alternatives discussed in Part II, other problems still remain in
determining the holding and legal significance of cases like Gertz, and Green Tree.

1. The Effects of the Marks Rule on Triple Choice Cases
a. The Easy Cases
No Court has faced difficulties in interpreting the holding of Screws. Recall that
the Justices determined four issues: (1) whether Mr. Screws’ acts fit within the statute, (2)
whether the act was unconstitutional, (3) whether the unconstitutionality could be fixed,
and (4) whether the errors in the case as to the third issue were harmless. A majority
voted on every issue, except for the final issue on whether a new trial was necessary to
fix the error. Justice Roberts, joined by two other Justices, refused to vote on the fourth
issue.113

different coalition in Green Tree II. However, so long as there is no majority for a particular position, the
same problems emerge.
111 Cf. Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 Theoretical Inq. L. 87, 123 n. 41 (2002)
(mentioning “the uncertainty imposed by a practice allowing the first court to announce its split and offer
no majority disposition”). There are also some theoretical difficulties with the meta-vote. The Justices who
voted to affirm the lower court decision in Green Tree II will be referring to a lower court decision in their
opinion. That is, Justice Thomas – for example – in Green Tree II, might hold that when a Court is deadlock,
the lower court decision governs. In Green Tree I, this means the South Carolina Supreme Court decision is
affirmed. In Green Tree II, which suffers the same deadlock as Green Tree I, however, this would mean the
case should be determined according to the state’s highest court’s opinion in Green Tree II. In this
hypothetical, the state Supreme Court adopted an issue-by-issue position, and it would appear that the
South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision should govern Green Tree II. The logic becomes untenable and
circular.
112 The notion of submajority rules will be developed in a work by Professor Adrian Vermeule. Submajority
Rules (in Legislatures and Elsewhere), (January 2004) U. of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 54,
www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=495569
113 See Part I.B.
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Fortunately, Screws can – and is – cited as authority on multiple points of law.
Regarding the first three issues, one can find a clear majority in favor of a particular
position. The final question of law, however, has no majority, but it is unlikely to have
much bearing on future cases. After Screws, lower courts know which standard to apply
and it would be difficult to find cases in which the same exact error was committed.
Consequently, Screws represents an easy case. The holding is discernable by
issue-by-issue voting and the final issue – which caused the triple choice problem in the
first place – is unlikely to re-appear in future cases.
b. The Pre-Marks Hard Cases
Alas, this is not true in the unidimensional triple choice freedom of the press
cases discussed above. Prior to 1977, when the Justices fell along a spectrum, as they did
in Gertz, there was no holding of the Court. That is, while a majority was able to dispose
of Gertz, courts could not cite the holding Gertz because there was no majority on any
particular position. For this reason, the 1967 Freedom of the Press case of Time, Inc. v.
Hill114 had no holding that would affect the outcome of the 1971 case of Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia,115 which, in turn, had no holding that affected Gertz in 1974.116 The
unidimensional triple choice freedom-of-the-press cases were all treated as having no
holding. As such, the issue was re-litigated and returned to the U.S. Supreme Court,
where again the Court was unable to agree and no holding resulted.
Multidimensional triple choice cases before 1977 were all treated the same way.
In 1953, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing reach the U.S. Supreme Court;117 to dispose of
the case Justices Frankfuter, Reed, Jackson, and Burton all switched from upholding to
remanding to achieve a majority.118 In 1965, the Fifth Circuit was asked to determine the
holding of Cushing – what it called “a grisly spectre of undefined size and shape.”119 The
appeals court “circumnavigated” Cushing stating, “Because of the Court’s extraordinary
division, it is impossible to say what the Cushing case stands for.”120 That is,
multidimensional triple choice cases like Cushing were treated as having no holding like
Gertz.
c. The Marks Rule
The law changed in 1977 with the handing down of Marks v. United States.121 In
Marks, the U.S. Supreme Court set out the following two-part test to determine the
holding of case where there is no majority agreeing to any particular position.
(1)
First, the court is to look only at the decisions composing the majority
on disposition;
(2)
Next, of those opinions, it is to pick the “narrowest” of them. The
“narrowest” opinion of those in the majority becomes the holding of
the Court.

385 U.S. 374 (1966).
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
116 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
117 347 U.S. 409 (1954) (argued April 27-28, 1953).
118 Id. at 423.
119 Colleman v. Jahncke Serv. Inc., 341 F.2d 956, 959 (1965).
120 Id.
121 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
114
115
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Pedcor Magm’t Co. v. North American Indemnity, NV122 shows how the Marks rule
operates in triple choice cases. In Pedcor, the Fifth Circuit applied the Marks rule to
determine the holding of Green Tree.123
The Fifth Circuit began by noting how a majority was achieved in Green Tree only
after Justice Stevens provided a fifth vote.124 Thus, the majority on the disposition had
two camps: (1) Justice Breyer, with three other Justices; and (2) Justice Stevens, who
grudgingly joined. The Fifth Circuit only considered these two opinions, consistent with
the first step in Marks.
Next, it tried to determine which opinion was “narrower,” a task that is normally
daunting.125 Fortunately, the Fifth Circuit picked Justice Breyer’s opinion. Although the
court does not go into much analysis on this point, consistency required it to pick Justice
Breyer’s opinion as the holding. Here is why:
Remember that the proceedings in Green Tree were remanded to an arbitrator
pursuant to Justice Breyer’s instructions. Had the Fifth Circuit instead found Justice
Stevens’ opinion to be the “narrowest” holding, Pedcor would be governed by a different
test than the one applied in Green Tree. That is, the proceedings in Green Tree would be
governed by Justice Breyer’s opinion, while the Pedcor proceedings and subsequent
cases would be governed by Justice Stevens’ “narrowest” opinion. This result seems
insensible, and perhaps explains why lower courts are unlikely to find that the voteswitcher had the “narrowest” holding of the Court.126
Consequently, the Marks rule’s narrowest holding requirement does not seem
applicable in cases where a vote-switch has occurred. The opinion that led to the
majority disposition in cases like Screws must be the “narrowest” holding under the
Marks rule for consistency purposes. It would be wrong, however, to disregard the
Marks rule in its entirety.

2. The Modified Marks Rule
Recall that the Marks rule requires lower courts to (1) limit themselves to the
opinions that form the majority on the disposition and then to (2) pick the “narrowest”
holding. In cases like Screws, however, there is no majority on the disposition of the case
(assuming no vote switch). Perhaps, under a Modified Marks rule, the lower courts
should skip directly to the second step and pick the “narrowest” holding if the Court is
deadlock and no vote switch has occurred. It could then work backwards and adopt the
opinion most likely to have achieved a majority in cases like Screws for the first step in the
Marks rule.
Gertz is a good starting point on how a court would go about predicting the
preferences of the Justices under a Modified Marks rule. Recall that the Justices fell along
a spectrum. On one end, Justice Blackmun and two others voted to uphold the case and
to establish high protections for the press. On the other end, Chief Justice Burger and
343 F.3d 355 (2003)
It began, somewhat awkwardly, by stating the Marks rule: “It is well established that when we are
confronted with a plurality opinion, we look to that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Id. at 358.
124 Id.
125 Cf. Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 Theoretical Inq. L. 87, 101 (2002) (“A
narrowest-majority rule is not always easy to apply.”); Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sage, “The
One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts,” 81 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 46 (1993).
126 Indeed, any other solution would induce all the Justices to switch in the hopes of their opinion becoming
the narrowest holding.
122
123
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one other Justice, voted to overturn the case and to defer to state law. Finally, Justice
Powell was in the middle requiring proof of fault. Joined by three other Justices, he
voted to remand the case.
Although Justice Blackmun switched from upholding to remanding to achieve a
majority disposition, the Modified Marks rule would make that switch unnecessary. We
know for sure that the Justices had the following as their first preferences:
Blackmun +2
Powell +3
Burger +1
First Preference:
Uphold
Remand
Overturn
In addition, we now know that Justice Blackmun preferred remanding the case to
overturning it. Similarly, the opinion of Chief Justice Burger suggests that he prefers
remanding the case to upholding it. Consequently, we can complete a table as follows:
Blackmun +2
Powell +3
Burger +1
First Preference:
Uphold
Remand
Overturn
Second Preference: Remand
Remand
Third Preference:
Overturn
Uphold
Given this composition of preferences, a lower court could apply a Modified
Marks rule and determine that remanding was the preferred position of the Justices. It
was the position that was most likely to have achieved a majority of the Court.
Consequently, Justice Powell’s opinion would become the holding, even though no
majority voted for it using the new rule.
In this situation, Justice Powell’s opinion would be – what is commonly called – a
Condorcet winner, since it would beat allalternative outcomes in head -to-head
competition. First, the remand outcome would beat an uphold outcome by a margin of
6-3. Justices Powell, joined by three Justices; and Chief Justice Burger, joined by one
Justice, prefer remanding the case to upholding it. Similarly, remanding the case beats
overturning by a 7-2 margin. Justice Powell, joined by three Justices; and Justice
Blackmun, joined by two Justices, would chose remanding the case over overturning it.
Perhaps this outcome helps explain our intuition that remand is an appropriate
“middle” position.

3. Problems with the Modified Marks Rule
Green Tree, however, raises questions about this methodology. Justice Stevens
stated that he preferred to uphold the South Carolina Supreme Court decision. Similarly,
because Justice Breyer’s opinion “was closer” to his, we can deduce his second and third
preference:
Rehnquist +2
Breyer+3
Stevens+1
First Preference:
Overturn
Remand
Uphold
Second Preference:
Remand
Third Preference:
Overturn
The remaining boxes in the chart above are not so clearly ascertained from the
opinions. As discussed above, a lower court is likely to find that Justice Breyer prefers
overturning the Supreme Court of South Carolina’s decision to upholding it. Recall, that
he remanded the Lackey proceedings back to the arbitrator despite the fact that the
arbitrator had independently approved class action arbitration. This decision might have
been motivated to give the arbitrator a second opportunity to avoid class action
arbitration, something Justice Breyer might dislike.
As for the Chief Justice’s preferences, there are two reasons to suspect that he
prefers upholding the case to remanding it. First, the Chief Justice Rehnquist devotes
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over half of his opinion to attacking Justice Breyer’s decision to remand the case. In
addition, the Chief Justice is usually perceived as a supporter of states’ rights. Deferring
to a state court’s interpretation of state law is probably preferable to removing from the
state court all power to adjudicate these claims.
While these predictions are by no means perfect, they do help illustrate a
peculiarity about the Screws rule. Consider the breakdown of preferences given the
assumptions about the preferences of the Justices:
Rehnquist +2
Breyer+3
Stevens+1
First Preference:
Overturn
Remand
Uphold
Second Preference: Uphold
Overturn
Remand
Third Preference:
Remand
Uphold
Overturn
Remand no longer seems like a “narrowest” position. While Justices Stevens and
Breyer form a majority preferring remand to overturn, Justice Stevens and the Chief
Justice prefer upholding to remanding. Thus, if given a choice between remanding and
upholding, a majority of the Justices would uphold.
Upholding, however, is not a Condorcet winner either. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Breyer would prefer the case be overturned to it being upheld.
Those familiar with seventeenth century French philosophers will be well aware
of an odd phenomenon in the preferences of the Justices. Condorcet cycling exists since
(I) overturning is preferred to upholding, (II) upholding is preferred to remanding, and
(III) remanding is preferred to overturning. The preferences seem to go in a circle.127
If the preferences of the Justices are as indicated in the chart above, a lower court
will be helpless to determine what position would most likely have achieved a majority
of the Court. While upholding beats remanding, remanding beats overturning, and
overturning beats upholding. There is no stable solution. The Modified Marks rule has
no solution stable enough to be called a solution that a majority would have accepted.
The lower court would be confused.
a. The Effects of Screws on the Problem
The Modified Marks rule could do more damage than just implied. Assume Green
Tree (with no vote switching) is re-litigated with the hope that lower courts would find
the narrowest holding. The parties would return to the South Carolina state courts,
where the plaintiff would argue that the divided Court in Green Tree upheld the South
Carolina Supreme Court decision. The defendant, however, would correctly counter that
more Justices prefer overturning the decision to upholding it.
The South Carolina trial court might accept the defendant’s argument that the
Chief Justice’s opinion in Green Tree is the “narrowest holding” of the various positions.
Contrasted with the plaintiff’s position that an affirmation is the “narrowest holding,”
the defendant’s arguments in favor of overturning would have generated more votes at
the U.S. Supreme Court. By a vote of seven-to-two, the Justices would have overturned
the state’s highest court to affirming it.
The plaintiffs would then appeal the trial court’s determination all the way to the
South Carolina Supreme Court. At the appellate level, plaintiff’s lawyers would argue
that remanding the case to an arbitrator is a better “narrowest holding” than

Cf. Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse a la Probabilite des Decisions Rendues a la Pluralite des Voix, in
Condorcet: Selected Writings 22 (K. Baker ed. & trans. 1976); Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual
Values (2d ed. 1963); Frank Easterbrook, “Ways of Criticizing the Court,” 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 815 (1982)
127
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overturning the South Carolina’s highest court decision because more Justices prefer
remanding the case to an arbitrator than prefer overturning the state court’s decision.
Thus, the trial court incorrectly picked the narrowest holding.
Given the chart above, the South Carolina Supreme Court would probably agree
with the plaintiff. Justice Beyer’s position remanding the case to an arbitrator generates
more votes than the Chief Justice’s opinion overturning it. Consequently, remanding is
more of a “narrowest holding” than overturning and the trial court’s determination
should be overturned.
The reader will not be surprised to learn that Green Tree I could be re-litigated all
the way back to the U.S. Supreme Court. In Green Tree II, the Justices would be asked to
determine the narrowest holding in Green Tree I (and whether the Marks rule applies at
all under the meta-vote from above). Needless to say, the Court could be divided again
and a cycle of litigation could continue indefinitely.
Thus, the Screws rule works in conjunction with the Marks rule to solve the
problem of re-litigation and confusion. First, the Screws rule limits cycling by forcing the
Court to narrow the outcomes on the table.128 The remaining positions are narrowed
further by the Marks rule after the case is handed down. Thus, Screws limits the need for
lower courts (and later the U.S. Supreme Court) to interpret between three different
outcomes. 129 After Screws, there are only two positions that form the majority; after
Marks, there is only one holding.
b. The Persistence of the Problem Despite Screws
While the Screws rule coupled with the Marks rule solves the problem of
subsequent litigation, it does not answer the question of who switches their position in
the original case. To understand why problems remain, imagine that the preferences of
the Justices in Green Tree are arranged in such a way to induce cycling between
remanding, overturning, and upholding:
Rehnquist +2
Breyer+3
Stevens+1
First Preference:
Overturn
Remand
Uphold
Second Preference: Uphold
Overturn
Remand
Third Preference:
Remand
Uphold
Overturn
Begin, as in Part II, A., with the default rule affirming when no majority is
achieved. Justices Stevens and Thomas are the only Justices who place affirming as their
first choice. Both the Chief Justice and Justice Breyer, however, prefer to overturn the
case.
Consequently, with these preferences, Justice Breyer will indicate to the Chief
Justice that he wants to join in overturning the case so as to avoid an affirmation by a
deadlock. The Chief Justice will be glad to accept Justice Breyer’s vote.
The reader should be able to anticipate what happens next. Justice Stevens
prefers remanding the case to having it overturned. Consequently, he will switch to
remanding the case. Both Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens prefer this outcome.
The next step will lead to a cycle: The Chief Justice prefers upholding the case to
having it remanded. Consequently, he will switch to upholding the case so as to avoid
remanding. Justice Stevens would gladly accept the switch.

128
129

Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 Theoretical Inq. L. 87 (2002).
Id.
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Thus a complete cycle has occurred. Justice Breyer switches to join the Chief
Justice, which induces Justice Stevens to join Justice Breyer, which induces the Chief
Justice to switch to join Justice Stevens. The cycle could continue indefinitely. While the
Marks rule joined by the Screws rule saves lower courts from getting stuck trying to
figure out the outcome when cycling exists, the rule does not help the Justices figure out
how to avoid the cycling themselves in the first place.
c. Alternative Solutions to the Problem
There are three solutions to the problem of cycling over the outcome of a case.
Deliberating in conference, Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court may have developed the
first group of solutions, while Dean Saul Levmore developed a second theoretical
solution. This Article critiques these two groups of solutions to the cycling problem, and
offers a third solution. It is worth noting in advance that no solution is iron-proof.
i.
External Salvation
When faced with cycling over the outcome of the case, U.S. Supreme Court
Justices might try to think outside of the box and turn to external procedural sources of
salvation. Specifically, the Court could (1) agree to re-hear the case, (2) seek other
options, namely dismissing the writ of certiorari, or (3) decide the case on an unrelated
ground, for example, on standing.
a. Re-hearing as a Solution to the Cycling
The Justices in Time Inc. v. Hill130 may have thought they found a way to avoid a
potential cycle, although – in the end – their hopes were shattered. Time Inc., like Gertz,
involved the protections offered to media outlets for libel against private individuals. In
conference after the case was first heard, the Justices were divided into three camps:
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas voted to uphold the state law as constitutional,
while Justices Black, Douglas, and Clark voted to overturn the state law as being a
violation of the First Amendment. Justices Harlan, Brennan, Steward, and White
remained uncertain as to the constitutionality of the statute. They voted to remand the
case for further clarification by the state’s highest court because they were unable to rule
on the law’s merits. Thus a three-way deadlock occurred.131
The Justices in Time Inc. tried to achieve a majority by re-hearing the case to
determine the scope of the state law. At first glance, re-hearing the case could expose the
Court to cycling, not save it from the problem. Consider the following hypothetical
ordering of the preferences of the Justices in Time Inc.:
Warren +1
Harlan+3
Black+2
First Preference:
Uphold
Remand
Overturn
Second Preference: Re-hear
Uphold
Re-hear
Third Preference:
Overturn
Re-hear
Remand
Fourth Preference:
Remand
Overturn
Uphold
Adding the option of re-hearing the case might create cycling, since re-hearing
beats remanding, remanding beats upholding the decision, but upholding beats rehearing.
Despite the possibility that adding a re-hearing option would induce cycling, the
Justices agreed to allow additional briefs as to the scope of the state laws.132 It was

385 U.S. 374 (1966).
Del Dickson, ed., The Supreme Court in Conference (1940-1985) 388-39 (Oxford 2001).
132 Id.
130
131
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believed that additional information would help the four Justices voting to remand
decide between upholding the law and overturning it as unconstitutional. Disaster was
supposed to be avoided.
But disaster hit again, and Time Inc. was added to the list of triple-choice
deadlocks like Gertz and Screws.133 Justice Harlan and Justice Brennan both continued to
insist that the case be remanded, but for a different reason. After the first hearing of Time
Inc., these Justices voted to remand for further clarification of the law. After the second
hearing of the case, however, these Justices voted to remand for a middle-of-the-road
freedom-of-the-press standard. Thus, the three-way deadlock re-occurred after the rehearing, even though the re-hearing was supposed to solve deadlock problem.
b. Dismissing the Writ as a Solution to the Cycle
In addition to re-hearing the case, the Justices have an additional option of
dismissing a writ as improperly granted.134 After the Court re-heard Time Inc. and after a
three-way deadlock re-emerged, the Court could have dismissed the writ of certiorari,
thus removing the problem by cutting it off at its source.
While the Justices did not resort to this solution in Time Inc., it is possible they
dismissed the writ of certiorari in other cases to avoid cycling.135 Two cases look
suspicious enough to justify closer examination. In Burrell v. McCray,136 the U.S. Supreme
Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the lower court determination. After
deliberation, however, one Justice who voted to grant the writ of certiorari switched his
mind and voted to dismiss the writ as improperly granted. A similar result was seen in
Wainwright v. City of New Orleans.137
Because the inner-workings of the Court remain secret, we can only speculate
that the Justices may have been divided over the disposition of the case in a way that
indicated cycling. For example, when the Justices discussed the case, one group might
have wanted to affirm, a second group to remand, and a third to overturn. Realizing the
deadlock, perhaps the Justices who wanted to remand expressed an interest in
overturning. This would induce the Justices who wanted to uphold to switch to remand,
which in turns induces the Justices who want to reverse to switch to upholding the case.
After multiple rounds of trying to reach an agreement, the Justices might have become

385 U.S. at 398.
See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (Justice Douglas, although wanting to dismiss writ of
certiorari, turns to merits and overturns lower court decision); New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 248 (1984)
(discussion of the Rule of Four).
Usually, the question of whether a writ was properly granted is considered a preliminary issue, which does
not affect the analysis in this Article. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983) (Justice Stevens, although
wanting to dismiss writ of certiorari, turns to merits); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (Justices
Stewart and White, although wanting to dismiss writ of certiorari, turn to merits); Udall v. Wisconsin, 306
F.2d 790 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Judge Washington, although wanting to dismiss the writ of mandamus, turns to
the merits). See, generally, Ira P. Robbins, Justice by the Numbers: The Supreme Court and the Rule of Four – Or Is
It Five?, 36 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
135 One caveat: It is difficult to know in how many cases the Justices suffer from cycling on the disposition of
a case and rely on alternative solutions. The Justices have an incentive to keep their cycling to themselves
and conference notes are not readily available. As demonstrated above, Justice engage in strategic behavior,
masking their opinions and writing them in such a way to maximize their effectiveness. Consequently, even
if the Justices knew a cycle existed, they would have an incentive not to memorialize the problem or to
mention it to outsiders.
136 426 U.S. 471 (1976)
137 392 U.S. 598 (1968)
133
134
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frustrated, and one Justice who voted to grant the writ switched to save the Court from
the problems posed. Thus, the debilitating cycling could come to an end by the method
by which it arose: the decision to grant a writ of certiorari.
c. Alternative Grounds as a Solution to the Cycling
If re-hearing the case and dismissing the writ of certiorari are not viable options,
the Court could use other tools for removing cases from its jurisdiction. Specifically, the
Political Question Doctrine, standing, mootness, ripeness, and abstention are a few
doctrines that the Court has developed to remove problematic cases from the Court’s
docket.138 When the Justices are divided over the outcome of the case on the merits, they
might be united in willing to forgo differences and decide the case on procedural
grounds. Thus three-way deadlock and cycles are hidden when Justices turn their
attention to procedural issues upon which they are more likely to be able to agree.
To summarize briefly, the three sources of external salvation just discussed (rehearing the case, dismissing the writ as improperly granted, and resorting to judiciallycreated procedural rules) are all defenses the Court has developed to break potential
three-way deadlocks. Nevertheless, these three Court-made solutions are not always
available. Consider the case of Green Tree, in which a rehearing would serve no purpose
(South Carolina law was clearly established). Next, the writ of certiorari in Green Tree
was properly granted, and the Justices would have had to bend over backwards to find
ways to dismiss it. Finally, the contract dispute in Green Tree was procedurally pure, and
doctrines like mootness, ripeness, or abstention could not apply. Indeed, avoiding the
case on procedural grounds would involve further “creative lawyering,” sparking
criticism from a range of sources. Thus, the solutions relied upon by Supreme Court
Justices are not perfect, and the Justices must search for other ways to avoid a cycle.
ii. Randomization
Dean Saul Levmore, the only scholar to discuss directly the problem of cycling
on the outcome of a case, suggests that the Court solves the cycling problem by
delegating the decision to a “randomizing agent,” namely a subsequent lower court.139
From his arguments, we can infer that if the Justices find themselves stuck in a cycle,
they have two options:
First, the Justices could write a one-sentence per curium opinion saying, “The
case is remanded for a disposition not inconsistent with the Court’s opinion” and then
attach three concurrences. In Green Tree, the Chief Justice would concur with the onesentence per curium opinion and would suggest that the case should be overturned for
the reasons stated in his opinion. Justice Breyer, on the other hand, would write his
concurring opinion in such a way to suggest the opinion should be remanded to an
arbitrator. Finally, Justices Stevens and Thomas would add their concurring opinions
suggesting the case should be upheld. The Justices would wait and see which concurring
opinion lower courts adopt as the holding of the case.
Alternatively, the Court could write a long, confusing, and cryptic opinion. For
example, in Green Tree, all the Justices would have agreed with the following holding:
“A contract must be enforced according to its terms, not inconsistent with federal law or
Cf David P. Currie, Federal Jurisdiction In a Nutshell(1999).
Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 Theoretical Inq. L. 87, 110 (2002) (“[W]e allow a
future interpreter to do the work for us... An optimist might say that a future court, or other interpreter, is
something of a randomizing agent with some possibility of using the advantage of time gone by to see
arguments or applications no apparent to the first panel.”).
138
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state law.” Of course, while agreement is achieved, a lower court would have no
guidance as to the ultimate merits on the interpretation of the Green Tree contracts.
Again, all the Justices would wait and see how lower courts would interpret the cryptic
opinion.
An element of randomness has been added to the process. Perhaps, the lower
court would read the per curium opinion or the ambiguous opinion as suggesting an
overturning of the South Carolina Supreme Court decision. Alternately, a lower court
might send the case to an arbitrator, believing that an arbitrator decision is “not
inconsistent with ... state law” and that the cryptic opinion so required. Finally, and
perhaps most plausibly in the Green Tree context, a South Carolina state court would
find that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the South Carolina Supreme Court decision in
Green Tree. Thus, the die has been cast and the U.S. Supreme Court Justices wait for
subsequent lower court decisions to solve the intractable dilemma. A lower court,
according to Dean Levmore, would serve as a “randomizing agent,” selecting between
the three opinions.
Dean Levmore’s theory of a “future interpreter” randomly picking between the
three competing positions is both novel and problematic. It is ingenious because Dean
Levmore has independently reached the only solution Economists have been able to
devise to overcome strategic behavior. If each Justice were given a lottery ticket and the
winner of the lottery had his or her opinion serve as the opinion of the Court, all Justices
would vote sincerely. It is notable that Dean Levmore devised his “randomizing agent”
solution without consulting (or at least citing) the Economics literature of the 1970s
reaching the same conclusion.
While theoretically pleasing, the “future interpreter” solution is perplexing and
inappropriate in the U.S. Supreme Court context. First, the “randomizing agent” theory
assumes a willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to relinquish power to a lower
court. While divided over the outcome of a case, the Justices might be united in
opposing having a state trial judge in rural South Carolina determine the outcome of
Green Tree. Indeed, the “randomizing agent” solution might not be a Condorcet winner;
all Justices would prefer having their decision serve as the holding of the Court to
having an uncouth state court judge make determinations for it.
Dean Levmore’s “future interpreter” solution is, however, is more problematic
because, as the saying goes, “The future is now.” Several months after Green Tree was
decided, the Fifth Circuit had to interpret the case’s holding in Pedcor Magm’t Co. v.
North American Indemnity, NV.140 If the U.S. Supreme Court did not like the holding of
the “future interpreter” (i.e. the Fifth Circuit), the highest court would grant a writ of
certiorari to re-hear the case. Thus, Dean Levmore’s “future interpreter” is just a lower
court – subject to Supreme Court review – that hears a subsequent case several months
after the initial division. The “randomizing agent” solution pre-supposes that the Court
would not re-hear the case, a bold assumption.
iii. Intensity Preferences
It is always easier to shoot down a theory than to build one up. Having exposed
flaws in the solutions identified by the Court and by Dean Levmore, I am tempted to
conclude by saying that the Justices are – pardon my French pun – Screwed in this
context. Nevertheless, I feel compelled to offer a solution to the intractable problem that
140
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focuses on three different types of intensities: as to judicial philosophies, as to the merits
of the case, and as to the Court as a political institution.
a. Intensities over Vote Switching as a Proper Act
for Judges
The first form of intensity involves the judicial philosophies of the Justices.
Reviewing the cases, one will find that certain Justices never engage in vote switching,
while others engage in it frequently.141 Justices Stevens and Rutledge have engaged in
more vote switches than any other members of the Court. Perhaps the answer to the
cycling problem lies in these statistics.
Individual Justices are likely to develop personal beliefs about their roles on the
Court. Vote switching is not something a Justice hopes to have to do frequently, and
certain Justices might have developed internal beliefs that such vote switching is wrong.
Consider again the case of Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing,142 in which Justices
Frankfuter, Reed, Jackson, and Burton all engaged in vote switching.
The language in Cushing suggests a possible discomfort in the act. While Justice
Frankfuter’s opinion is written in the first person, the act of vote switching is written in
the third person, suggesting someone else had done the switching for these four Justices.
Again, I am speculating, but Cushing may reflect a discomfort by some Justices to
deviate from their preferred position. While vote switching in Screws is cited as
necessary to achieve a majority disposition, the strategic behavior that actually occurs is
perceived as less acceptable. Perhaps, some Justices either prefer not to engage in such
conduct, or – when they do – to attribute the act of vote switching to a third party.
Thus, in Green Tree, although Chief Justice Rehnquist has the ability to perpetuate
the cycle by switching to affirming, he believes doing so is beyond his power – or at least
he prefers not to do so publicly. This ends the cycle with Justice Stevens’ switch to
remand. There is no cycling because the Chief Justice, like Herman Melville’s Bartleby,
“prefers not to” switch.
b. Intensities as to the Merits of the Case
Justice Stevens’ opinion in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, suggests a second
type of intensity: namely over the merits of the case. Recall from above that Justice
Stevens preferred to uphold the South Carolina Supreme Court decision but switched to
remand. One reason he, as opposed to any one else, switched was that he was not
particularly beholden to his position. He wrote, “because petitioner has merely
challenged the merits of the decision without claiming that it was made by the wrong
decisionmaker, there is no need to remand the case to correct that possible error.” That is,
he preferred to uphold the case on a minute procedural ground, which future lawyers
will be more careful to correct. As to the more important question of whether to have
class-action arbitration, he agrees with his colleagues (with some reservation) that
“[a]rguably the interpretation of the parties’ agreement should have been made in the
first instance by the arbitrator, rather than the court.”
In situations like Green Tree, one Justice cares less about his or her preferred
outcome than the others do. Should someone have to change his or her vote on the
merits, it is more likely that this person would be the one to do so. 143
Supra n 5.
347 U.S. 409, 410 (1954)
143 See Evan Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2297, 231316 (1999). He writes: “A Justice’s willingness to switch from his sincere to second-best disposition should
141
142
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c. Intensities as to the Court as a Political
Institution
Finally, as Professor Caminker argued, members of the Court might place a
different “value ... on constructing a majority-disposition coalition such that the Court
can issue a judgment in the Instant Case.”144 That is, some Justices will not be concerned
with whether cases like Green Tree remain as deadlocks, while others will feel that the
Court as an institution will be harmed should there remain uncertainty with the
meaning of cases like Green Tree. In this sense, the Justices are “playing chicken” waiting
to see who will flinch first, and a Justice changes his or her vote to ensure that there is no
Green Tree II. Phrased differently, each Justice will assess his or her own risk tolerance
before making a decision whether to sacrifice in the immediate case to help the Court
survive as a political institution in the future.
Weighing all three intensities, the Court engages in a multivariate balancing.
Justices whose judicial philosophies prevent them from engaging in vote-switching, who
have strong preferences as to the merits of the case before them, and who are not
particularly concerned about whether the Court as an institution suffers will wait until
another Justice – one whose judicial philosophy is more forgiving of public switches,
who is not beholden to a particular position on the merits, and who is more concerned
about the Court as an institution – switches his or her vote (with some Justices in
between these two extremes). In each case, the intensities are varied, explaining why it is
not always the same Justice who switches. The adjudicator with the lowest combined
intensities against vote switching will be the one to engage in the vote switch. And
because the institution is small enough, the Justices can informally figure out, and keep
track of, which Justice is the least adverse to changing his or her vote.
Two other Economic tools, the free-rider problem and the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
come into play at this point.145 Consider the free-rider problem first. In general, vote
switching is not the preferred activities of Justices (were it a benefit, more would do so
even after a majority were formed). Nevertheless, in some cases, someone must engage
in the dirty work and switch to help the Court achieve a majority and prevent relitigation and embarrassment. Consequently, Justices have an incentive to over-state
their incentives against vote switching, hoping that someone else will cave first. The
intensity-over-stator would enjoy the benefit of another Justice’s vote switch without
ever having to engage in a vote switch of his or her own.
Should every Justice be an intensity-over-stator and should every Justice refuse
to sacrifice for the Court, the institution itself will suffer. In the earliest days of the
Republic, Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court each wrote their own opinions, leading to
confusion. While each Justice benefited by having his personal views articulated in full,
depend on both institutional and substantive variables. First, how much value does he place on constructing
a majority-disposition coalition such that the Court can issue a judgment in the Instant Case? Second, based
on the magnitude of perceived error assessment how strong is his preferences for his top-ranked disposition
(D1) over his second (D2), and his second-ranked over the third (D3)?” Professor Caminker, however, seems
to miss the negotiation around the default rule phenomenon when he argues, “There is[] no articulated
rationale for [the] patterns [of vote switching] in any of the cases.” Id. at n 52. He, however, then recovers
when he writes, “It appears that the choice whether to stand firm or switch (and to what) is left up to the
strategic judgment of each faction.” Id. His succinct treatment of the triple-choice cases is reflective of other
scholarship that deals with this issue tangentially.
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, et al., Game Theory and the Law 48-49, 176, 189, 203, 308, 312-13 (1994).
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the Court failed to provide any guidance to litigants. After John Marshall’s ascension to
the position of Chief Justice, there was a clear majority for every case, and the Court’s
reputation was enhanced. Concurrences and dissenting opinions remained rare until a
recent explosion of plurality decisions and deadlocks like Green Tree. Today, cases like
Tidewater demonstrate increasing confusion over how to treat the Court’s holdings
(indicating the Court has discounted or forgotten the harm caused by the pre-Marshall
system), and the institution’s reputation for providing clear guidance to the legal
community has suffered.
Modeled in term of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, one finds:
Compromise for the sake
Refuse to compromise and
of the Court’s reputation
increase personal benefits
(and correctly state
(by lying about intensities)
intensities)
Compromise for the sake
Enhanced reputation of the
Free-rider problem
of the Court’s reputation
Court with lack of
benefiting those who refuse
(and correctly state
individuality (Marshall Era)
to compromise
intensities)
Free-rider problem
Confusion over holdings,
Refuse to compromise and
increase personal benefits benefiting those who refuse while individually Justices
(by lying about intensities)
to compromise
benefit (pre-Marshall)
Although this model is an over-simplification, for example by ignoring benefits
to the institution from dissenting and concurring opinions and the fact that some
Justices might be happy that vote switching is the cross they are forced to bare, it does
offer insight into one interesting fact about vote switching. One could ask why, if vote
switching is considered something to avoid, Justices engage in vote switching publicly.
Hiding the vote switch would achieve the same beneficial effects for the institution
while minimizing the negative effects to the individual Justice who actually switches.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma model offers a solution.
As repeat and mostly agreeable players, the Justices have an incentive to
maximize the their collective take-away from the matrix above. Alternately allowing
some Justices to dissent or concur would give Justices a chance to make their mark
without harming the institution by doing so. Similarly, distributing the burden of vote
switching in the cases that are most likely to harm the Court would help avoid the
bottom right section of the matrix. Consistent with the work of Robert Axelrod,146 a
public system keeping track of who voted when would enhance the effectiveness of this
wealth-maximizing system, and concurrences, dissents, and vote switches in cases like
Green Tree must be recorded for the benefit of members of the Court (e.g. from new
members who were unaware of previous switches or from subsequent disputes over
who did the dirty work in the past).The public vote switch, therefore, is a reminder by
the switching Justice that he or she has done his or her job in saving the collective
institution and that next time, his or her colleagues will be responsible for the dirty – yet
essential – work of the Court. Although Stevens and Rutledge assumed a
disproportionate share of these chores, other Justices help out too, sustaining the system
and protecting the Judiciary’s reputation. Thus, an informal wealth-maximizing,

146

The Evolution of Cooperation (Reprint 1985).
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intensity-aggregating system seems to offer a solution to the problems posed by Arrow’s
Impossibility Theorem, discussed above.
Summary
A meta-analysis of the Screws problem identifies more instances of strategic
behavior. A rule that would treat uni- and multidimensional cases differently will only
induce Justices to write their opinions strategically. Next, a proposal to conduct a metavote could induce Justices to switch their votes earlier to prevent such a meta-vote from
ever occurring. Finally, given lower courts powers to predict the outcome that would be
agreeable to a majority of the Court exposes the problem of cycling. When cycling
occurs, the Justices find alternative ways to prevent it, for example, by dismissing the
writ as improperly granted, or arbitrarily moving onto different issues.
Finally, no solution to the cycling problem was able to solve all of the conditions
identified in Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. The three solutions identified, namely
external procedural salvation, randomization, and intensity preferences, all fit within
Kenneth Arrow’s seminal work on cycling. According to the Nobel Prize winning
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, cycling can be avoided by reference to “irrelevant
alternatives.” The three procedural sources of salvation are all “irrelevant” to the initial
three-way deadlock on the merits, and they therefore can save the Justices. Dean
Levmore’s “randomizing agent” is also external to the original deadlock and therefore
“irrelevant” according to Arrow’s work. Finally, judicial intensities are “irrelevant” to
the merits of each position in the three-way deadlock. Our intuition to look outside the
box to solve the deadlock within the box was predicted by Arrow’s work, and it is not
surprising to see the suggestions contained in this Article.
But it is worth noting how all three solutions are, nevertheless, “irrelevant.” In
order to remove cycling, the Justices must resort to some external principle. The Court
might be pre-disposed to look to “irrelevant” procedural rules external to the merits of
the case. Dean Levmore looks to the “irrelevant” opinion of a lowly state trial court,
while I, instead, look to a Justice’s “irrelevant” beliefs about their functions on the Court
and other preferences. Following a lawyerly intuition, the reader might try to figure out
which solution is less “irrelevant” than the other. I leave this for another day, and
simply note that they are all bad answers because, according to Arrow, there are no
good answers to the problem.

Conclusion
At this point, the reader might be frustrated, yet invigorated. Justices are
engaging in vote switching, citing a rule with no authority. Suggestions of ways to
prevent the vote switching, however, begin to expose additional strategic behavior that
is hidden by the Screws rule. Indeed, the best reasons for the Screws rule seem to be that
(1) it gives Justices an opportunity to say they are willing to take a certain position and
then back down to achieve a majority,147 (2) it helps Justices avoid applying Durant and
an affirmation,148 and (3) it prevents future litigation that can induce additional more
embarrassing deadlocks.149 None of these nuts and bolts is likely to appear in a case
reporter in the near future.
Part I. C.
Part II. A.
149 Part III. B. The Article was intended to itself exhibit a form of cycling. Justifications for the Screws rule are
in Parts I. C.; II. A.; and III. B. Replacing letters for the Roman numerals and filling in the remaining slot, one
finds the following pattern:
147
148
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This frustration was to be expected. The Economics literature has demonstrated
that strategic behavior is inevitable.150 The only solution in the literature is in a 1977
article by Professor Gibbard in which he suggests inducing randomness.151 If we were to
give every Justice a lottery ticket and assigned the winner of the lottery the ability to
write an opinion for the Court, we would ensure that Justices voted sincerely. Alas, this
solution seems inappropriate in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court, where “case or
controversies,” and not lotteries, are to be decided.152
I submit, in conclusion, that the best justification for the Screws rule is that it
forces a closer examination of its own existence, as done in this Article.153 While this
examination is unlikely to help the parties in Screws and Green Tree, it does offer insight
into the adjudication process and the issues facing Justices today. Furthermore, the
secrets of Screws teach us not only about the Justices and their behavior, but about our
own Sisyphus-like attempts to overcome the strategic behavior and cycling we will
never be able to overcome.

Reason 1 (in Part I. C.):
A, C, B
Reason 2 (in Part II. A.):
B, A, C
Reason 3 (in Part III. B.):
C, B, A.
Thus, an Article on Condorcet cycling itself shows elements of Condorcet cycling through its structure. Cf,
John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons about the Law from Self-Referential Problems in Mathematics,
90 Mich. L. Rev. 992 (1992); Douglas R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (1999).
150 See Douglas H. Blair, On the Ubiquity of Strategic Voting Opportunities, 22 Int’l Econ. Rev. 649, 649 (1981)
151 Allan Gibbard, Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance, 45 Econometrica 665 (1977).
152 U.S. Const. Art. III.
153 H. Ron Davidson, Sweeny’s Prayers: Organized Religion and Organized Labor 58, (Unpublished Bachelor
Thesis 1999) (“[The] gift in this situation may be the question itself, and not the answer.”).
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